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EYING THE BODY: THE IMPACT OF
CLASSICAL RULES FOR DEMEANOR
CREDIBILITY, BIAS, AND THE NEED TO
BLIND LEGAL DECISION MAKERS1
Daphne O’Regan
INTRODUCTION
The Honorable Mark W. Bennett is only the most recent
observer to lament that “[t]he standards for determining witness credibility have persisted as if frozen in time, based on
myth, and completely unconnected with current knowledge of
cognitive psychology.”2 Judge Bennett’s frustration is understandable. The belief that most people can reliably detect lies
by scrutinizing the body of the speaker is quite simply false, a
fact recognized for at least twenty-five years—or 2,500.3 Increasing awareness of implicit or cognitive bias in decisionmaking renders continued reliance on physical signs of credibility even more suspect.4 The question that remains is: Why has
1. Daphne O’Regan, Michigan State University College of Law. I thank
Professors Linda Edwards, Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Sammy Mansour, Larry
Cata Baker, Peter Yu, and Marc Poirier, and students and former students
Matthew Piccolo, Nicholas Schroeder, Thomas Skuzinski, and Michael Foster
for their help.
2. Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Unspringing the Witness Memory and Demeanor Trap: What Every Judge and Juror Needs to Know About Cognitive
Psychology and Witness Credibility, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1331, 1371 (2015). For
demeanor in general, see id. at 1346-51. The impact is widely discussed. See,
e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Centennial Address: Emotion, Reason, and the Progress of Law, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 921, 924 (2013).
3. Olin Guy Wellborn, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1088
(1991) was the seminal work with about 195 citing references (last checked
on WestlawNext, Jan. 16, 2017). The legal academy no longer credits demeanor evidence, yet the courts, with a few exceptions, ignore this widespread consensus. See Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias,
and Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2557, 2563-64 (2008). As shown infra Part
I, the problem was recognized in Euripides’ Hippolytus, first produced in 428
B.C.E. EURIPIDES, HIPPOLYTUS, in EURIPIDES I 160 (David Grene & Richmond
Lattimore eds., David Grene trans., 1955).
4. For cognitive bias, see Carla L. MacLean & Itiel E. Dror, A Primer on
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nothing changed?5 One neglected explanation is the continuing, but unacknowledged, influence of classical rhetoric.6 The
educational history and immense prestige of elite rhetoric has
embedded its traditional forms and ideological claims deeply
into legal education and practice.7 Highly specific, elite rules
about bodily credibility are so entrenched that they seem ordinary common sense,8 even as they are taught to first-year law
students and as they govern behavior in courtrooms.
But allegiance to the classical paradigm of bodily credibility is not just a matter of conservatism and the impact of histothe Psychology of Cognitive Bias, in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS:
STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW 13-21
(Christopher T. Robertson & Aaron S. Kesselheim eds., 2016) [hereinafter
BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS]. For recognition of the impact of implicit or
cognitive bias in law, see infra note 312.
5. Other tools for determining credibility may well work, such as the
content of what is said, cross-examination, context, and questioning strategy.
Minzner, supra note 3, at 2563-64. This article discusses only credibility determinations based on conventional physical markers of truthfulness or deception.
6. Gerald Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA.
L. REV. 1545, 1555 (1990).
7. Wetlaufer points out “discipline-specific rhetorics are cultural artifacts . . . [and] are the products of circumstances and purposes and that in a
certain way they have a life of their own. Further, this structure suggests
that we may be blind to certain choices we have made and to certain consequences associated with those choices.”
Id. at 1587-88.
Similarly,
“[e]xamining the presuppositions of evidence law may nevertheless be useful
by helping to explain the resistance that has blocked most proposed innovations. The causes of this resistance would otherwise be hard to understand.”
John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1257
(2006).
8. For the idea that credibility is to be assessed with common sense,
which includes demeanor, see 1 CHARGES TO THE JURY AND REQUESTS TO
CHARGE IN A CRIMINAL CASE IN NEW YORK § 3:2 (2015). “As Judge Jerome
Frank . . . observed, the methods of evaluating oral testimony ‘do not lend
themselves to formulations in terms of rules and are thus, inescapably, ‘unruly.” John L. Kane, Judging Credibility, 33:3 LITIG. 31, 31 (Spring 2007),
http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Judges/JLK/Judging_Credi
bility_LITMAG_Spring07_kane.pdf. “Determining the weight and credibility
of witness testimony . . . has long been held to be the ‘part of every case [that]
belongs to the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural intelligence and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men.’” United
States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998). Thus, “the epistemology of evidence law is also rooted in common everyday beliefs that have not been fully
analyzed by courts or academics.” Daniel D. Blinka, Why Modern Evidence
Law Lacks Credibility, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 357, 361 (2010).
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ry. Presuppositions driving classical demeanor permeate legal
assignments of rationality and emotion, truth and lies. These
presuppositions, in tandem with the ancient theory of a universal language of non-verbal communication, may have little basis in fact, but they perform crucial structural work.9 They reduce the perceived institutional risk of error due to cultural,
social, and individual differences in demeanor. But even more
importantly, they reconcile the professional claims of highly
trained, persuasive advocates10 with the truth-seeking goal of
adversarial trial.11 However, this same demeanor paradigm
imposes tragic risks of error on participants in litigation. A
modest solution is changed instruction in law schools. A more
far-reaching solution, increasingly embraced to reduce biases,
extends a suggestion made by Blumenthal and Pager: judges
and juries should be screened so they cannot see any participants in a legal proceeding.12
In what follows, I focus on law students and attorneys, not
parties, witnesses, experts, and others. Part I briefly provides
background: the pivotal role of classical rhetoric in western education, including the United States, the dispositive position of
demeanor credibility in oral trial, and the persistent doubts
about its reliability—doubts turned into certainty over two
decades of research. Part II compares modern and ancient

9. Similarly, both Fisher and Leubsdorf find much about the rules of evidence and the jury’s role to be explained by institutional necessity. See
Leubsdorf, supra note 7, at 1209; George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 624 (1997).
10. Similarly, refusal to allow expert testimony about eyewitnesses may
also be “to affirm the professionalization of American trial procedure by lawyers and judges.” Note, The Province of the Jurist: Judicial Resistance to Expert Testimony on Eyewitnesses as Institutional Rivalry, 126 HARV. L. REV.
2381, 2382-83 (2013).
11. See generally Hon. Mark I. Bernstein, Jury Evaluation of Expert
Testimony Under the Federal Rules, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 239 (2015); Franklin
Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 117
(1996).
12. Physical screening would be one form of blinding. For recent work
on blinding in law and biomedical and forensic science, see MacLean & Dror,
supra note 4. See also, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Is Blind Hiring the Best Hiring?,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.
(Feb.
25,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/magazine/is-blind-hiring-the-besthiring.html (proposing blinding to remedy lack of diversity in hiring). The
proposals of Pager and Blumenthal are discussed infra Part VI.
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manuals to explain the rules of elite demeanor and its ideological claim to truth. Part III compares ancient and modern understanding of popular delivery; that is, choices in non-verbal
communication that run counter to the elite rules and demonstrate affiliation with non-elite groups as grounds for credibility. Part IV shows how elite rules are enforced in law schools
and courts, limiting how advocates can speak and, thus, what
can be communicated. Part V discusses the role of an assumed
natural, common, bodily language in erasing the problem of actual differences and justifying the paradoxical claim that a jury
can be manipulated by highly trained professionals, yet ferret
out lies. Part VI discusses benefits of the common adoption of
elite demeanor and suggests improved instruction at laws
schools and screening decision makers in litigation to reduce
the cost.
I. BACKGROUND: Classical Rhetoric’s Influence and
Demeanor’s Deception
Classical rhetoric, which evolved in tandem with trial and
the democratic and republican political structures of ancient
Athens and Rome, has been the foundation of western education for over 2000 years.13 It is hard to overstate its influence
in the ancient world, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment in
Europe and the United States, and in the nineteenth century.14
The enormous importance of classical studies in the United
States, including rhetoric, has been summed up as “[n]ext to
Christianity, the central intellectual project in America before
the late nineteenth century was classicism.”15 Finally, classical
13. GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC & ITS CHRISTIAN AND
SECULAR TRADITION FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 1-5 (1999); BRIAN
VICKERS, IN DEFENCE OF RHETORIC vii-viii (1998).
14. See MICHAEL H. FROST, INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL
RHETORIC: A LOST HERITAGE 1-22 (2005); THOMAS HABINEK, ANCIENT
RHETORIC AND ORATORY 79-100 (2005); ADAM KENDON, GESTURE: VISIBLE
ACTION AS UTTERANCE 17-61 (2005); James J. Murphy, Quintilian’s Influence
on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, in ORAL AND WRITTEN COMMUNICATION: HISTORICAL APPROACHES 158,
160-62 (Richard Leo Enos ed., 1990); Michael Frost, Introduction to Classical
Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 613, 615-16 (1999).
15. CAROLINE WINTERER, THE CULTURE OF CLASSICISM: ANCIENT GREECE
AND ROME IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL LIFE 1780-1910 1 (2004). See, e.g.,
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rhetorical theory is enjoying an explicit revival today.16 To the
extent that this profound impact goes unrecognized,17 its influence is increased18—its rules seem self-evident as demonstrated in the next section. Central to ancient instruction in rhetoric was the “science” of body language, or demeanor.19
Traditionally called “delivery,” this branch of rhetorical theory
concerns persuasion not through what is said, but through how
it is said—the famous non-verbal persuasion.
The crucial importance of non-verbal communication is often marked by quoting the Athenian orator Demosthenes’ famous quip that in competitive speaking, how a speaker communicates wins first, second, and third place.20 The same point
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, LECTURES ON RHETORIC AND ORATORY (1810).
16. See, e.g., ROBERT N. SAYLER & MOLLY BISHOP SHADEL, TONGUE-TIED
AMERICA: REVIVING THE ART OF VERBAL PERSUASION 13-27, 55-95, 111-27, 13945 (2011). The authors are professors at the University of Virginia Law
School. Id. at xv.
17. “[L]aw lives in the speech of lawyers and clients [and] in the gestures of attorneys and witnesses . . . . Notwithstanding our traditional inclination to ignore them, these and other ‘alternative’ legal texts have always
had presence and power.” Bernard J. Hibbitts, Making Motions: The Embodiment of Law in Gesture, 6 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51, 52 (1995) (discussing specific gestures that have been endowed with substantive legal meaning).
18. For the legal profession’s “systematic denial” that it employs a particular rhetoric, see Wetlaufer, supra note 6, at 1555.
19. Delivery is the fifth canon, or part, of technical rhetoric and is, itself,
divided into a number of subcategories. Catherine Steel, Divisions of Speech,
in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ANCIENT RHETORIC 77, 81, 86-88 (Erik
Gunderson ed., 2009) [hereinafter THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION].
20. See, e.g., QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA XI.iii.6 (Loeb Classical
Library) (E.H. Warmington ed., H.E. Butler trans., 1968) [hereinafter
QUINTILIAN]; CICERO, DE ORATORE III 213 (Loeb Classical Library) (T. E. Page
ed., H. Rackham trans., 1942) [hereinafter DE OR]; CICERO, ORATOR xvii.56, in
BRUTUS; ORATOR (Loeb Classical Library) (H.M. Hubbell trans., 1939). See
CICERO, RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM III.x.19 n.c (Loeb Classical Library) (T. E.
Page ed., Harry Caplan trans., 1954). Translations will be from these editions unless otherwise noted. Citation to these and all ancient works will be
to the traditional sections or line numbers of each work, as pages may differ
in different translations. Ray Nadeau, Delivery in Ancient Times: Homer to
Quintilian, 50 Q. J. SPEECH 53 (1964). The same story attributed to Cicero
opens the first page of The Columbian Orator, widely read inside and outside
of schools, including by Frederick Douglas. CALEB BINGHAM, THE COLUMBIAN
ORATOR 7-10 (1797). “The book cover indicates that the United States Government authorized its publication by an Act of Congress in May 1797, for
the specific purpose of ‘developing the fundamental art in and instilling the
spirit of oratory among the youth of America.’” Marguerite L. Butler, The Na-
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is made with percentages: “Only 7 percent of one’s message is
communicated verbally; the remaining 93 percent is communicated non-verbally through speech tenor and tone, body language, and physical demeanor.”21 While discouraging, these
warnings are usually a preface to instruction.22 For two millennia, the study of persuasive non-verbal communication has
generated an outpouring of rules. The deluge continues today.23
The centrality of legal demeanor derives from what
Leubsdorf identifies as the first presupposition of trial: the
commitment to presence and the human speaker.24 Trial has
been an oral event since its beginning, with decision often predicated on judgments about the speakers,’ including attorneys,’
credibility.25 The problems of this institutional commitment
were recognized early. Hippolytus, an influential tragedy of
democratic Athens, stages the results of Theseus’ decision to
find not credible a truthful verbal denial of an accusation of
tional Frederick Douglass Moot Court Competition—Operating in the Spirit
and Legacy of Frederick Douglass, 25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 66, 76 (2002). The book
recycles the precepts of classical rhetoric while adding passages from other
sources. Demosthenes’ formulation continues to have legs. See, e.g., PAUL
MARK SANDLER, RAISING THE BAR: PRACTICE TIPS AND TRIAL TECHNIQUE FOR
YOUNG MARYLAND LAWYERS 119-137 (2005).
21. Jason Bloom & Karin Powdermaker, Building Rapport in the Courtroom, 69 TEX. B.J. 540, 540 (2006) (citations omitted).
22. See generally, e.g., Michael J. Higdon, Oral Argument and Impression Management: Harnessing the Power of Nonverbal Persuasion for a Judicial Audience, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 631 (2009).
23. For example, entering “non-verbal communication” into a Google
search returned 389,000 results (last updated Jan. 11, 2016).
24. Leubsdorf, supra note 7, at 1237. For the centrality of oral evidence
in the early criminal trial, see JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY
CRIMINAL TRIAL 236-37 (2003). See generally, Keith Werhan, The Classical
Athenian Ancestry of American Freedom of Speech, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 293
(2008).
25.
For the orality of Athenian and Roman trial, see, e.g.,
ARISTOPHANES, THE WASPS 835-995, in ARISTOPHANES I (Loeb Classical Library) (G. P. Goold ed., Benjamin B. Rogers trans., 1978) (a parodic trial) and
PLATO, SOCRATES’ DEFENSE (APOLOGY), in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF
PLATO 1-26 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns, eds., Hugh Tredennick
trans., 1961) (Socrates’ speech at his trial). Forensic (that is, legal) oratory
was one of three subdivisions of classical rhetoric. ARISTOTLE, “ART” OF
RHETORIC § 1358a-b (Loeb Classical Library) (J.H. Freese trans., 1982). See
generally, Jon Hesk, Types of Oratory, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION, supra
note 19, at 145, 150-56.
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rape.26 This credibility determination is dispositive. As a result, his son, the innocent Hippolytus, dies.27 Hippolytus’ unjust death and Theseus’ mistake—believing the truth to be a
lie—derive from a fatal shortcoming in human speech: it bears
no mark of truth or falsity.28 Instead, Theseus can only wish
that “[a]ll men should have two voices”–one for unjust statements, the other for the truth—so “we should never be deceived.”29 The Greek word for voice (phone) focuses not on content, but on pitch and tone.30 Conviction and death of the
innocent raise a terrible possibility: these two voices do not exist. Yet the promise of delivery and assessment of demeanor
credibility–central to the structure of the Athenian and the
American legal systems—is, in essence, that they do. Fundamental to the structure of trial and modern appeal is the presupposition that the body and voice of the speaker can, and
must, function as the touchstone of truth.31
26. EURIPIDES, supra note 3, at 885, 942, 1036 ff. (Citation is by line
number.)
27. Id. at 1162.
28. The play “focuses the audience’s attention on their own (actual or
potential) role as citizen-jurors in Athens’ lawcourts.” JON HESK, DECEPTION
AND DEMOCRACY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 277 (2006).
29. EURIPIDES, supra note 3, at 924-31.
30. HENRY G. LIDDELL & ROBERT SCOTT, A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON
1967-68 (1894).
31. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 52(a) requires the reviewing
court to “give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.” FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). “[D]emeanor of an orally-testifying
witness is ‘always assumed to be in evidence.’ It is ‘wordless language.’”
Broad. Music v. Havana Madrid Rest. Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1949).
Standards of review favor trial courts’ observations of demeanor. Inwood
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982). The Seventh Circuit
in United States v. Nobles stated:
The trial judge has the best opportunity to observe the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the witnesses focusing on the
subject’s reactions and responses to the interrogatories,
their facial expressions, attitudes, tone of voice, eye contact,
posture, and body movements, as well as confused or nervous speech patterns in contrast with merely looking at the
cold pages of an appellate record. We refuse to second-guess
the trial judge on matters of credibility . . . .
United States v. Nobles, 69 F.3d 172, 181 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
However, if “credibility determinations rest, not on demeanor of which the
judge was the sole observer, but on an analysis of testimony . . . [,] [they] de-
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Yet demeanor credibility simply does not work. The belief
that truth can be adequately detected, at least in a legal context, from the body, is largely false. As first discussed in Wellborn’s landmark article in 1991,32 most people detect truth or
lies at a rate almost equal to chance—one influential researcher puts the figure at 56.6 percent—and are “particularly poor at
detecting lies (correctly judging that someone was lying: 44%
accuracy rate).”33 The rate may be somewhat better for “professional lie catchers,” falling between 55 and 66 percent.34
“[T]he most basic reason for the failure to detect lies is that
there is no single verbal, nonverbal, or physiological cue
uniquely related to deception.”35 Even if universal bodily expressions of emotion exist, a strong cultural overlay influences
both the physical expressions themselves and the ability to
read them, particularly in individuals from other cultures.36
serve less than usual deference.” Consolidation Coal Co. v. N.L.R.B., 669
F.2d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1982). See Chet K.W. Pager, Blind Justice, Colored
Truths and the Veil of Ignorance, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 373, 375-76 (2005).
32. See Wellborn, supra note 3, at 1088; see also Renée McDonald
Hutchins, You Can’t Handle the Truth! Trial Juries and Credibility, 44
SETON HALL L. REV. 505, 508 (2014); Mark Spottswood, Live Hearings and
Paper Trials, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 837 (2011); Pager, supra note 31, at
379-92; Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The
Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L.
REV. 1157, 1188-92 (1993). Paul Ekman points out the many constraints on
bodily lie detection; not only do “behavioral hot spots,” or micro expressions,
only indicate an emotion that is departure for investigation, they are manifest in only 50 percent of liars. Paul Ekman, Lie Catching and Microexpressions, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF DECEPTION 118, 132 (Clancy Martin ed., 2009)
(emphasis omitted). For new strategies, see, e.g., William A. Woodruff, Evidence of Lies and Rules of Evidence: The Admissibility of Fmri-Based Expert
Opinion of Witness Truthfulness, 16 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 105 (2014), and Julie
A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427, 443 (2008). But see generally
James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903 (2000) (supporting credibility determinations).
33. Aldert Vrij, Nonverbal Communication and Deception, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION 341, 349 (Valerie Manusov &
Miles L. Patterson eds., 2006).
34. Id. at 350-51.
35. Id.
36. There may be universal expressions of certain emotions, modified,
however, by a cultural overlay. See generally David Matsumoto & Hyi Sung
Hwang, Cultural Influences on Nonverbal Behavior, in NONVERBAL
COMMUNICATION, SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 97-120 (David Matsumoto, Mark
G. Frank, Hyi Sung Hwang, eds., 2013). The specifics of gestures are even
more culturally determined, as is the meaning of gaze, particularly its direct-
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Further, legal institutions “over-rely upon visual cues to their
own detriment: visual information diminishes accuracy.”37
Paul Ekman, probably the preeminent authority on physical
signs of deceit and coiner of the widely used term “leakage” to
describe the physical clues of emotion and deceit,38 has stated:
“Anyone who says there is an absolutely reliable sign of lying
that is always present when someone lies and never present
when someone is truthful is either misguided or a charlatan.”39
II: ELITE DEMEANOR AND TRUTH
The agreement that demeanor is critical obscures the fact
that the rhetorical rules applied in courtrooms today emerged
from an intense, and often bloody, struggle for dominance in
Athens and Rome, played out in part through contrasting elite
and popular rhetoric, including contrasting demeanors.40 Even
when the influence of ancient rhetoric is recognized, reception
of this theory continues to be uncritical, and the theory itself is
sanitized of its roots in ancient class and political struggles.41
Yet theory and practice are permeated by values and claims
that drove struggle.42 And traditional advice incorporates them
into modern practitioners and legal practice. The dominant
elite tradition successfully imposed aristocratic, upper class
demeanor, including the physical habits of wealthy foot soldiers, as natural and linked to rationality and truth.43 Writers
ness. David Matsumoto & Hyi Sung Hwang, Body and Gestures, in
NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION, SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 77-83 (David
Matsumoto, Mark G. Frank, Hyi Sung Hwang, eds., 2013).
37. Pager, supra note 31, at 391 (emphasis added). See Vrij, supra note
33, at 352.
38. Paul Ekman & Wallace Friesen, Nonverbal Leakage and Clues to
Deception, 32 PSYCHIATRY 88 (1969) (using the term “leakage”).
39. Ekman, supra note 32, at 133.
40. See DAPHNE O’REGAN, RHETORIC, COMEDY AND THE VIOLENCE OF
LANGUAGE IN ARISTOPHANES’ CLOUDS 9-13 (1992) (discussing the early part of
this period). See generally JOSIAH OBER, MASS AND ELITE IN DEMOCRATIC
ATHENS: RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY, AND THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE (1989) (showcasing a somewhat optimistic view).
41. 72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137 An Introduction to Persuasion in the Courtroom: What Makes a Trial Lawyer Convincing? §§ 34-37 (1999).
42. See infra Parts II and III.
43. See infra Section II.A.
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in the same elite tradition damned non-elite, democratic
speakers as using artificial skills, including delivery, based on
irrationality and emotion.44
A. The Dominant Tradition: Credible Speaker as
Elite Warrior
Strength and power are the foundation of the elite speaker’s credibility.45 Thus, a twentieth century manual exhorts
the advocate:
You must make a “neutral stance” your new habit. Stand squarely with feet approximately
shoulder-width apart. Let your hands land at
your sides. Don’t lock your knees; and put your
weight on the balls of your feet. This is a very authoritative way of standing in front of an audience. You can make natural hand gestures from
this position, but it will help you to remain solid
and grounded . . . Although you might feel uncomfortable at first, you will look confident. Superfluous movement only damages your argument, and your credibility.46
A proper advocate stands as a fighter; his argument and
delivery are described as one.47 Improper gestures not only
44. ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, §§ 1403b-1404a. Section 1404a links delivery to deficiency and emotional appeals starting with the sophist Thrasymachus. Id. § 1404a. The sophists were the theoreticians of democratic
rhetoric at Athens. KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 18, 23.
45. Experiments have shown “eyewitness confidence, rather than accuracy, was the identified predictor of juror belief.” Wellborn, supra note 3, at
1090.
46. Leonard Matheo & Lisa DeCaro, The Eleven Most Frequently-Asked
Questions About Courtroom Presentation and Performance, in ALI-ABA’S
PRACTICE CHECKLIST MANUAL FOR TRIAL ADVOCACY 171 (2001). For a compendium of precepts that provide additional sources for much advice discussed in
this section and the next, see Jansen Voss, Student Article, The Science of
Persuasion: An Exploration of Advocacy and the Science Behind the Art of
Persuasion in the Courtroom, 29 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 301 (2005).
47. The martial ideal of the elite advocate invokes courage, associated
with justice, as one of the four cardinal virtues. See Judith Resnik & Dennis
Curtis, Epistemological Doubt and Visual Puzzles of Sight, Knowledge and
Judgment: Reflections on Clear-Sighted and Blindfolded Justices, in
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damage credibility, but the argument itself. The extent to
which elite delivery is that of a warrior and the underlying significance of this paradigm emerge even more clearly in the following celebratory description of an advocate before the Supreme Court:
She stands erect behind the podium, her feet together. She speaks in a low, yet clearly pitched,
voice. She does not gesture. She is completely assured, totally prepared, meticulous in her
knowledge of the details of her argument. And
she is utterly convincing. When the justices query her, she listens attentively, head slightly
bowed. Her answers show she has understood
the questions and appreciates their force. She
does not shrink from the challenges. She knows
this battle will not be won in a day. She is prepared for a long campaign.48
The advocate embodies the requirements of elite delivery.
Her low voice and immobility represent courtroom decorum at
its strictest; her body conveys the primacy of mind. Her restraint appeals to and underwrites beliefs about the proper limits of motive and persuasion that reinforce the court’s claim to
rationality and impartiality. The stripped-down body models
the “ideal” legal discourse: one that privileges universalization,
not personal experience; social rules, not individual situations;
and reason, not emotion.49 Within the classical and modern
GENEALOGIES OF LEGAL VISION 238-39 (Peter Goodrich & Valerie Hayaert
eds., 2015); PLATO, LACHES §§ 190d, 198a, 199d, in THE COLLECTED
DIALOGUES 132, 141, 143 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Benjamin Jowett trans., 1961); Terry A. Maroney, Angry Judges, 65 VAND. L. REV.
1207, 1230 (2012). Maroney links the higher status of anger as an emotion to
the ancient discussions of anger that focus on treatment of slaves versus
treatment of equals. Id. at 1219-24.
48. Herma Hill Kay, Equal Treatment, AM. LAW., Dec. 6, 1999, at 72.
49. This parallels physically the linguistic attributes that Bourdieu
identifies as creating a “neutralization effect” on the language to “establish
the speaker as universal subject, at once impartial and objective”: “indicative
mood . . . verbs in the present and past third person, . . . the factual, . . . indefinites . . . the intemporal present . . . transsubjective values presupposing
the existence of an ethical consensus[,] . . . fixed formulas and locutions.”
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rhetorical/legal culture, such elite delivery plays a fundamental
role in establishing decisions as compelled by legal reasoning
and rules whose goal is truth. It befits the Supreme Court, a
forum conceived of as dedicated to pure argument over legal
principles before an audience of the legal elite.
This praise incarnates the speaker as hero. The fact that
the passage describes a woman, in virtually unchanged traditional terms, demonstrates social flexibility – women may incarnate the classical ideal of power and truth50—and the continuing vitality of the classical model – in fact, they must do so,
if they wish to be recognized as rational speakers, at least in
elite rhetorical fora.51 The price this exacts from legal participants and institutions is discussed below. Here, what is of interest is the rooting of credibility, in both ancient and modern
norms, in the ability to defend oneself and one’s words.52 This
advocate will not be intimidated by “force” or “challenges;” she
is in for the “long campaign.” Nothing will vary her message,

Pierre Bourdieu & Richard Terdiman, The Force Of Law: Toward A Sociology
Of The Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 820 (1987). See Wetlaufer, supra note 6, at 1558-62, for similar characteristics designed to win by suppressing the possibility of alternative interpretations or perspectives on a legal problem and representing the desired outcome as required by the rule of
law, not men. For the construction of this impersonal legal voice see J. Christopher Rideout, Voice, Self, and Persona in Legal Writing, 15 LEGAL WRITING
67, 99-100 (2009).
50. Likewise, John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, authors of Just
Words, show that many women and poor or uneducated men speak “a language of deference, subordination, and nonassertiveness, whereas others [including some women] spoke in a more rhetorically forceful style.” JOHN M.
CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, JUST WORDS 65 (2d ed. 2005). Powerless language, “associated primarily with the speaker’s status in society,” was less
likely to be believed. Id. For “women lawyers’ talk [a]s role behavior rather
than gendered behavior, with little difference between men and women lawyers,” see Bryna Bogoch, Gendered Lawyering: Difference and Dominance in
Lawyer-Client Interaction, 31 L. & SOC’Y REV. 677, 677 (1997).
51. Elite lawyers understand the power of conforming to the ancient
paradigm particularly when they are female, minority, or otherwise outside
the traditional paradigm. See BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY (2014) (discussing the importance of conservative attire); SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY
BELOVED WORLD 229 (2013) (discussing the advantages of reasoning and talking like a man).
52. In women, “low, even” voice and “imposing height and voice” allow a
female attorney to be “intimidating” and endow her with “physical signs of
commanding presence” that enhance her credibility and effectiveness. SAM
SCHRAGER, THE TRIAL LAWYER’S ART 131-32 (1999).
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the consistency of which she can vouch for in her person.
1. Displaying Power: Gestures That Guarantee
Truthfulness
The overlap of truthful speaker and successful warrior has
ancient roots. In classical rhetoric, the orator “is usually heroic . . . ; he imposes his will on others. In contrast the role of the
speaker is much less emphasized in the rhetoric of India or
China, where harmony rather than victory is often the goal.
The classical orator is a fighter in a lonely contest.”53
“[R]hetoric is the special speech of the state . . . the occupation
of off-duty soldiers.”54 The connection goes back at least to the
Iliad. There, Achilles, pre-eminent in words and deeds,55 is the
only truthful speaker because he alone cannot be intimidated.56
His martial and rhetorical exploits define the realm of human
53. KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 10. For martial metaphors and the adversarial system, see Adam Arms, Metaphor, Women and Law, 10 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 257 (1999); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How
Images of Battle, Sports, and Sex Shape the Adversary System, 10 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 225 (1995); Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L.
REV. 1053 (1989).
54. HABINEK, supra note 14, at 2, 65-66. The individual fighting on foot
“valorized facing danger, standing one’s ground, and cooperating with fellow
soldiers, and relished victory (preferably quick) in a well-regulated, open,
face-to-face confrontation.” JOSEPH ROISMAN, THE RHETORIC OF MANHOOD:
MASCULINITY IN THE ATTIC ORATORS 106 (2005). Superior manhood and superior social class were associated. See id. at 85-88, 95-104. “[P]overty [w]as a
liability in the attainment of manhood,” particularly in the courts, where the
poor man was considered at a “moral disadvantage.” Id. at 95, 97. See Erik
Gunderson, Discovering the Body in Roman Oratory, in PARCHMENTS OF
GENDER 7, 170 (Maria Wyke ed., 1998); Fritz Graf, Gestures and Conventions:
The Gesture of Roman Actors and Orators, in A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
GESTURE 44-45 (Jan Bremmer & Herman Roodenburg eds., 1991). A speaker’s training was conceptualized as like that of a soldier. In QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.19, a proper masculine voice is achieved through walking, massage, abstinence from sex, easy digestion of foods, that is,
“frugalitas.” These are regimes of an athlete, a warrior, and a philosopher,
scaled down to more attainable level. Those who fail run the risk of “the ‘feeble shrillness’ that characterizes the voices of ‘eunuchs, women and invalids.’”
Id. See also ERIK GUNDERSON, STAGING MASCULINITY 81-82 (2000); MAUD W.
GLEASON, MAKING MEN: SOPHISTS AND SELF-PRESENTATION IN ANCIENT ROME
119 (1995).
55. HOMER, THE ILIAD IX 443 (Richmond Lattimore trans., 1965) [hereinafter THE ILIAD].
56. Id. at I 120-220. VICKERS, supra note 13, at 3-6 cites references to
Homer in ancient rhetorical theory.
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excellence, not as alternatives, but as an organic whole. For
the audience, one lesson is clear: ability to defend one’s speech
is a predicate for trust.
The credible speaker must be invulnerable to inner, as well
as outer, pressures.57 As rhetorical theory and practice developed, one example became Pericles, aristocratic leader of newly
democratic Athens.58 Pericles’ self-presentation was designed
to illustrate his power, and his power over himself. He was
famous for self-restraint, composure uncorrupted by emotion, a
quiet and even voice, and movements that left even the relatively loose Greek garments unruffled.59 His reputation for absolute freedom from fear and desire was enhanced by his aristocratic status and successful career as a general.60

Figure 1
57. “[S]elf-control enabled men to resist the undesirable and incapacitating influences of desire and, hence, to behave morally . . . Lack of restraint
detracted from one’s manliness and was regarded as a source of danger to
other men, their values, and their institutions.” ROISMAN, supra note 54, at
184.
58. Of course, Pericles’ character did not go unchallenged. His enemies
associated him with the new popular rhetoric, and he was notorious for his
association with the sophists. O’REGAN, supra note 40, at 11-15, 56-57.
59. PLUTARCH, PERICLES § V.1 (Loeb Classical Library) (Bernadotte Perrin trans., 1916). For Pericles’ legendary self-control, see id. §§ V, VII.4. In
the year that his sister, son, many relatives, and friends died of the plague,
he was recorded as weeping only once: when he laid a funeral wreath on the
grave of his last living legitimate son. Id. § XXXVI.5. PAUL ZANKER, THE
MASK OF SOCRATES 27 (ALAN SHAPIRO, trans., 1995) also links this story to
Pericles’ bust.
60. PLUTARCH, supra note 59, §§ III.1, VII.1, X, XVI.3.
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Pericles’ bust, Figure 1,61 represents this elite ideal.62 Pericles is shown with a helmet, symbolizing military command.63
His face is regular and smooth, unemotional and symmetrical.
The identity of the bust has been known since antiquity64 with
its “idealized yet distinctive” features.65 The lack of physical
idiosyncrasies and the stern composure convey the message
that Pericles’ words are not personal, although they emerge
from an identifiable person. Instead, in the body of Pericles,
the viewer sees the picture of rational civic discourse, speaking
for the public good, turned aside neither by fear nor favor.66
The overlap of warrior and speaker begins with stance.
Standard modern advice was given above. Ancient treatises
agree that credibility begins with a stance that “should be upright, . . . feet level and a slight distance apart, or the left may
be very slightly advanced. The knees should be upright, but
not stiff, the shoulder relaxed, the face stern, but not sad, expressionless or languid: the arms should be held slightly away
from the sides.”67 The advice is Cicero’s. Once he began, Cicero’s ideal orator would have a strong and manly posture derived from armed conflicts or, at least, the gymnasium.68
Posture is critical. Aristotle codified the social and political “naturalness” of the connection between “good” posture and
rationality in his justification of social hierarchy and slavery.
61. This picture is of a Roman copy of the bust from a statute of Pericles. The bust is at the Vatican Museums. The image is available on Wikimedia Commons.
File: Pericles Pio-Clementino, WIKIMEDIACOMMONS,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pericles_PioClementino_Inv269_n2.jpg (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
62. Beth Cohen, Perikles’ Portrait and the Riace Bronzes: New Evidence
for “Schinocephaly,” 60 HESPERIA: J. AM. SCH. CLASSICAL STUD. AT ATHENS
465, 469 (1991).
63. Id. at 470.
64. Id. at 465-66, 469.
65. Id. at 466.
66. Pericles’ bust and a statue of a poet erected by Pericles are “images[s] of a model citizen of High Classical Athenian society.” ZANKER, supra
note 59 at 27. It was “Pericles himself who set the standard of behavior.” Id.
For Pericles’ indifference to public opinion, see PLUTARCH, PERICLES supra
note 59, §§ XXXI.5- XXXII.1, XXXVI.3.
67. QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.159
68. DE OR, supra note 20, at III.lix.220; quoted by QUINTILIAN, supra
note 20, at XI.iii.122.
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Given that mind should rule over body, and rational over irrational, those who are more body are natural slaves, while those
who are more mind should be masters. Posture marks the difference; good posture indicates the superiority of mind. “Nature would like to distinguish between the bodies of freemen
and slaves, making one strong for servile labour, the other upright, and although useless for such services, useful for political
life in the arts both of war and peace,” that is fighting and
speaking.69 The tight connection between class, successful violence, credible argument, rationality, and posture lives on in
modern advice. “Keep the weight evenly distributed on both
feet; you will feel more steady. Indeed, when weight is not
evenly distributed, you are unbalanced and an easy pushover
for someone on the attack.”70 “Slouching or leaning . . . may
telegraph to the fact finders a feeling of physical weakness or
instability. This association may carry over to the fact finders’
perceptions of the lawyer’s case.”71 “[T]he goal is a relaxed but
erect posture that conveys an aura of composure and command.”72
A measured walk is also necessary and revealing.73
“[W]hile one man’s gait reveals his composure and the attention he gives to his conduct, another’s reveals his inner disor69. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1254b 25-30 in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
(Richard McKeon ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., 1941). In a concession to observation that does not trouble his theory, he acknowledges that Nature can
make a mistake so that “some have the souls and others have the bodies of
freemen.” Id.
70. Constance Bernstein, Winning Trials Nonverbally: Six Ways to Establish Control in the Courtroom, 30 TRIAL 61, 63 (Jan. 1994). See also
LAWRENCE J. SMITH & LORETTA A. MALANDRO, COURTROOM COMMUNICATION
STRATEGIES 69 (1985).
71. PETER MURRAY, BASIC TRIAL ADVOCACY 78 (1995). Judges are included as understanding posture as argument. “A slouching attorney gives
an impression of sloppiness, which might cause a judge to be skeptical of
what he has to say.” 6 AM. JUR. TRIALS 771 Nonjury Summation § 23 (2006).
72. Steven Wisotsky, Speak With Style and Authority, 37:2 LITIG. 16, 17
(Winter 2011). See also, SAYLER & SHADEL, supra note 16, at 67-70 (offering
the same advice).
73. Graf, supra note 54, at 47; Jan Bremmer, Walking, Standing, and
Sitting in Ancient Greek Culture, in A CULTURAL HISTORY OF GESTURE 16-23
(Jan Bremmer & Herman Roodenburg eds., 1991). On the cultural significance of walking in Rome, see ANTHONY CORBEILL, NATURE EMBODIED:
GESTURE IN ANCIENT ROME, 107-37 (2004). See also CICERO, DE OFFICIIS
I.xxxvi.131 (Loeb Classical Library) (Walter Miller trans., 1951).
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der and lack of self-restraint.”74 “The orderly man reveals his
self-restraint through his deportment: he is deep-voiced and
slow-stepping, and his eyes, neither fixed nor rapidly blinking,
hold a certain indefinably courageous gleam.”75 Roman rhetorical rules frown on pacing, swaying, and foot tapping.76 Modern speakers are advised to “[a]void all unnatural and distracting mannerisms.77 This includes pacing back and forth
uncontrollably, a movement that is highly distracting to jurors.
Most of the advocate’s movement during her courtroom speech
should be restricted to the upper body. This still leaves plenty
of room for physical expression.”78 As Ball puts it, “[s]tillness
conveys confidence and strength.”79 Conversely, fidgeting implies deception and weakness.80
The credible speaker “will also use gestures in such a way
as to avoid excess: he will maintain an erect and lofty carriage.”81 “He will control himself by the pose of his whole
frame, and the vigorous and manly attitude of the body, extending the arm in moments of passion and dropping it in

74. GLEASON, supra note 54, at 61 (translating DIO CHRYSOSTOM,
ORATIONS 32.54).
75. Id. (translating and citing Anonymous Latini). See Bremmer, supra
note 73, at 45; QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.112.
76. See QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.124 (regarding errors in
stance). Running is disallowed, as is standing on one foot, shifting the
weight, and swaying. Id. at IX.iii.128. This is to avoid an effeminate manner. Warnings against pacing as reflecting poorly on the advocate’s selfcontrol and argument abound in the modern literature. See, e.g., 72 AM. JUR.
TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 59. “When you are on your feet, keep your
weight evenly balanced on both legs . . . When you take a step, take it for a
purpose . . . . [I]f you are not actually going somewhere, stand still . . . You rid
yourself of wriggles, fidgets, and pointless wandering by monitoring yourself
all the time . . . .” DAVID BALL, THEATER TIPS AND STRATEGIES FOR JURY
TRIALS 8-9 (3d ed. 2003).
77. CICERO, ORATOR, supra note 20, at 59.
78. W. Ray Persons, Preparing and Delivering the Defense Closing Argument, 16 NO. 3 PRAC. LITIGATOR 55, 60 (2005).
79. BALL, supra note 76, at 5.
80. Thus, a liar “fidgets when answering critical questions, his eyes
shift from the floor to the ceiling, and he manifests all other indicia traditionally attributed to perjurers.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
270 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 855 F.2d 963, 974 (2d Cir. 1988).
81. CICERO, ORATOR, supra note 20, at 59.
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calmer moods.”82 Excessive movement must be avoided, as
should rapid, small, or overly large gesticulation. Quintilian
prohibits “[a]ny frenetic movements . . . or wild gesticulation . . . . Gesticulation has only limited amplitude: the hand
should never be raised higher than the eyes or lower than the
chest, and it should never move further to the left than the
shoulders.”83 Modern rules require the same restricted range
for acceptable gestures:
Keep your hands in their own quadrants. Think
of your body as being divided by a horizontal line
at shoulder level and by a vertical line that bisects you in front from top to bottom. Don’t let
your right hand cross the vertical line to the left
or your left hand cross to the right, or you will
seem to be defensively closing yourself off. Don’t
let either hand rise above the horizontal line at
your shoulders. If it does, it is going up there for
no good purpose (catching a fly, or touching your
face—or worse).84
Gesture, too, is given moral significance that, in turn, is
conceptualized as central to its credibility. Graf sums up the
approach of the ancient sources:
Moderation in movement is . . . peculiar to a free
man . . . a free man is not only a social category,
it is a way of living, thinking, and being; being a
free man means also having a free
soul. . . . Strictly moderated and limited gestures,
then, are an indication of moderate and selfcontrolled character.85
82. Id. at 59-60.
83. Graf, supra note 54, at 46 (summarizing QUINTILIAN, supra note 20).
84. BALL, supra note 76, at 6-7. Likewise, touching the face is “look[ing]
like you are trying to hide something other than your face—such as the
truth.” Id. See RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM, supra note 20, at III.xv.27;
QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.123.
85. Graf, supra note 54, at 47 (summarizing ancient views). Traditionally, moderation was not a virtue for the poor. PLATO, CHARMIDES § 161, in
THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns
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The modern “Inverse Gesture Rule”86 relies on the same
understanding: “Using many gestures means speakers need
help with what they are saying; using only a few gestures along
with good word choice means to jurors that those words can
stand alone.”87 The Rule clearly positions gesture within the
mind/body duality: more body equals less mind; less body
equals more mind.
Advice about other symbols of class and power clarifies the
cultural matrix that shapes “natural” indicators of credibility.
The advocate’s attire should be manly.88 Before speaking, he
should “rise with deliberation,89 . . . secure a moment for reflexion[sic], [and] devote a brief space to arrangement of [the] toga.”90 Arranging the toga made conspicuous the speaker’s
membership in the dominant class: free, male citizens, socially
and financially secure. Today, a suit is obligatory to evoke the
jurors’ habit of obedience: “dark suits warn[sic] by lawyers
symbolize serious work . . . ; classic silk ties are a clue to the
lawyer’s supposed station in life; a strong voice with certain
resonant qualities give[sic] a cue to power within the speaker.”91 Like rearranging the toga, foregrounding the suit has a
clear purpose:
eds., Benjamin Jowett trans., 1961). Gleason discusses Seneca’s idea that
“[a] man’s stride reveals the condition of his soul,” especially his masculinity,
and is closely related to his voice. GLEASON, supra note 54, at 113. The individual elements of delivery entail each other. For a similar overlapping in
which an uneven voice is compared to a limping gait, see QUINTILIAN, supra
note 20, at XI.iii.43.
86. 72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 16.
87. Id.
88. QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.137.
89. “Then, when authorized by the court, rise slowly but deliberately
and approach the jury in a calm and steadfast manner. After addressing the
court – pause! Do not plunge immediately into the presentation. Allow the
jury a momentary opportunity to observe you and your countenance.” Persons, supra note 78, at 59. “The short pause before the commencement of address is a time-honored technique of outstanding speakers and advocates of
all kinds. It lends itself especially well to the courtroom setting.” Id. at 60.
See also 72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 58.
90. QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.156. “It is a good idea for a man
to keep his suit jacket open while sitting and button it on rising to address a
judge or jury for a major speech. The act of buttoning it seems to project a
message of serious intent.” ROBERTO ARON ET AL., TRIAL COMMUNICATION
SKILLS § 4.08, 4-16 (1996).
91. 72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 43.
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[to] create in other the desire for obedience . . . .
Obedience, taught from the cradle, carries forward into the political, legal, military, religious,
and
familial
structures
of
our
nation. . . . [O]beying authority figures who control
rewards and punishment in various relationships
(family, work, etc.) proves advantageous to most
people, as does obeying those authority figures
who have greater wisdom.92
The conventional invocation of wisdom to conclude a recital
of power justifies elite delivery and explains its claim. The
quotations illustrate the overlap between power, credibility,
and truth that shape the elite norm. Only those who must be
obeyed can be trusted because they, alone, have the autonomy
to speak truth.93

92. Id. The idea that the habit of obedience is important and should be
invoked by attorneys is common. Smith & Malandro candidly pointed out:
“The basic human response to authority is automatic and instinctive. Most
people defer to authority figures allowing them to influence both their behaviors and decisions. Jurors particularly seek out authority figures in the courtroom to guide their responses. This explains, in part, the success of the ‘act as
if’ technique.” SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 70, at 251-52. A few sentences
later, “believability” is tied elite delivery. “To increase the perception of credibility, first increase the perception of authority . . . through changes in personal appearance, voice, and behavioral cues.” Id. at 252. “Instinctive” above
naturalizes learned responses to signals of power. This down-to-earth passage dispenses with the conventional nicety of filtering the result through
wisdom or truth.
93. To manifest strength is thus the underlying imperative of elite demeanor rules. As will be discussed below, the opposite is also true: vulnerability, betrayed by non-elite gestures, begets lies:
Confidence gestures are crucial for advocates who wish to be
discerned as poised and in control of the situation. These
gestures are identified (1) as not exhibiting gestures that
show lack of confidence, and (2) showing certain gestures
that exhibit confidence. For example, (1) not scratching or
touching the head or covering the mouth, having downcast
eyes, indirect body orientation, closed bodily posture, or (2)
having excellent posture with chin slightly raised and showing the power gesture and the open palm (“I have nothing to
hide.”).
84 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1 Body Language for Trial Lawyers: Persuasive Gestures,
Postures, and Foot Movement in the Courtroom § 18 (2016).
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B. How Liars Look: Physical Vulnerability and Mental Weakness
Deviations from elite practice are not simply non-verbal
mistakes. Failure to follow elite rules ties the speaker and his
words to females, the insane, the poor, children, slaves, and the
powerless.94 Ancients and moderns distrust the speech of the
weak as potentially deceptive and irrational,95 and prey to the
violence of others and the speaker’s own need and desire.96
The Iliad set the stage when Thersites, an ordinary soldier, dares to speak in the army council to argue for the common soldiers’ interests.97 The inappropriate nature of his
speech is expressed in physical terms that have continued to
resonate in rhetorical practice. Thersites is bow-legged, lame,
round-shouldered, and bald, with a shrill voice.98 His non-elite
body and voice, the opposite of the deep voice, strong legs, and
luxuriant hair characteristic of heroic leaders, identify Thersites with his audience, the mass of infantry. Thus, Thersites
becomes a precursor of popular delivery, that is, delivery that
emphasizes its affiliation with the non-elite audience and rejects elite rules of non-verbal behavior.
Thersites’ reception illustrates the fundamental problem
with non-elite speakers: their words are at the mercy of others.
Thersites is weak. The heroic Odysseus first insults him and
94. “Cicero and Quintilian are policemen of behavior and style, encouraging students to cultivate a ‘naturally’ masculine attitude, and punishing
those who had the look and sound of the slave, the foreigner, the ill-educated
man, or the woman.” Joy Connolly, The Politics of Rhetorical Education, in
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ANCIENT RHETORIC 126, 135 (Erik Gunderson ed.,
2009) (citation omitted).
95. For contemporary distrust of powerless language, see CONLEY &
O’BARR, supra note 50, at 60.
96. ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, § 1354b, 1369b-1370a. On the two types
of pleasure, one associated reason, the other with the body and the irrational,
see id. § 1370. On a similar connection among truth telling, status, and control of the appetites in discussion of jurors and witnesses in the thirteenth
century, see Fisher, supra note 9, at 589. Those likely to lie included: “slaves,
women (in certain circumstances) those below the age of fourteen, the insane,
the infamous, paupers, infidels, [and] criminals.” Id. at 590.
97. THE ILIAD, supra note 55, at II.211-277. For Thersites as representative of a non-elite perspective, see, e.g., Peter W. Rose, Thersites and the
Plural Voices of Homer, 21 ARETHUSA 5 (1988).
98. THE ILIAD, supra note 55, II.216-219.
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orders him to be silent.99 He ends by clubbing Thersites,
threatening to strip him naked and expose his genitals (the ultimate sign of human physicality) should he speak again.100
Thersites is left weeping, bloody, and cowering silently on the
ground.101 The fact that Thersites was merely repeating points
Achilles made earlier foregrounds the extent to which the reaction to his speech is driven by its speaker, not its content. As
Quintilian candidly remarks, not Thersites’ speech, but its
speaker, made his words laughable.102 Thus, Thersites is the
precursor to the figure in Figure 2, a figurine of a slave from
the fourth century B.C. comic stage.103

Figure 2

99. Id. at II.245-60.
100. Id. at II.260-65. These are unique phrases in epic and draw extra,
negative attention to Thersites’ body.
See G.S. KIRK, THE ILIAD: A
COMMENTARY, VOL. 1: BOOKS 1-4, 143 (1985).
101. THE ILIAD, supra note 55, at II.267-69.
102. QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.i.37. Quintilian’s remark indicates that Thersites is a comic figure, and as such “think[s] with [his] bod[y],
not with [his] head[]: fear is registered in the bowels, and desire in the stomach . . . . [I]t is the posture and particularly the set of the shoulders that tells
us what the mask is thinking.” David Wiles, The Poetics of the Mask in Old
Comedy, in PERFORMANCE, ICONOGRAPHY, RECEPTION 374, 382 (Martin
Revermann & Peter Wilson eds., 2008).
103. Bronze statuette of a comic actor, 400-350BC from Greece,
NM64.163, NICHOLSON MUSEUM, UNIV. OF SYDNEY. (Measurements:
8.1x6.8cm). Figure 2 is a bronze statue of a comic slave wearing characteristic slave mask. Made in Greece.
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Comic slaves were notorious liars,104 but, to elite eyes, they are
merely an extreme example of the characteristics of the untrustworthy—women, beggars, and non-elite men—with waving arms, shrieking voice,105 disordered clothing, contorted faces, and backs bent from blows.106
Conventional markers of fear or servitude are fatal to credibility.107 Quintilian advises that shortening the neck gives a
look of servility, flattery, admiration, and fear.108 Modern advice warns, “[h]unched shoulders say ‘I am insecure and I feel
defeated. I am weak.’”109 As a result, “your head will jut forward as if it is about to drop off, the courtroom dog will growl
at you.”110 Any gesture that signals protection of the genitals
104. Slaves were considered understandably prone to lying. This commonplace informs Quintilian’s remark that lying, “which is at times reprehensible even in slaves, may on other occasions be praiseworthy even in a
wise man.” QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XII.i.39.
105. For women’s speech as seductive, untruthful, and shaped by the
female body and necessities of the womb with its related hysteria, see generally Lesley Dean-Jones, The Cultural Construct of the Female Body in Classical Greek Science, in SEX AND DIFFERENCE IN ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 19297 (Mark Golden & Peter Toohey eds., 2003); Joy Connolly, Mastering Corruption: Constructions of Identity in Roman Oratory, in WOMEN AND SLAVES
IN GRECO-ROMAN CULTURE (Sandra R. Joshel & Sheila Murnaghan eds.,
1998); Nancy Demand, Women and Slaves as Hippocratic Patients, in WOMEN
AND SLAVES IN GRECO-ROMAN CULTURE 56 (Sandra R. Joshel & Sheila Murnaghan eds., 1998); Ann Bergren, Language and the Female in Early Greek
Thought, 16 ARETHUSA 69 (1983).
106. Sitting, particularly upon the ground, was characteristic of beggars
and slaves. See Bremmer, supra note 73, at 25. Slaves and beggars listen
and speak from need, motivated by hunger and fear so that they say what
will please, rather than what is true. See, e.g., HOMER, ODYSSEY 14.122-132
(Richard Lattimore trans., 1967); O’REGAN, supra note 40, at 61-63.
107. “The determination of credibility (conversely deception) often is
read in the facial expression of fear.” Michael Searcy et al., Communication
in the Courtroom and the “Appearance” of Justice, in APPLICATIONS OF
NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION 53 (Ronald E. Riggio & Robert S. Feldman eds.,
2005). The authors link this to the contemporary concept of leakage and
“fear of getting caught,” yet “in the absence of an acute conscious or obvious
sense of guilt about lying, using NVC [nonverbal communication] alone to determine witness credibility is difficult.” Id.
108. QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.83.
109. 72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 58. SONYA HAMLIN, WHAT
MAKES JURIES LISTEN TODAY 211 (1998), identifies round shoulders as “weak
and insecure . . . [giving an] air of incompetence and self-doubt.”
110. BALL, supra note 76, at 5.
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is, not surprisingly, even more taboo. “The lawyer should never grasp [his] hands together in front of the crotch area or behind.”111 “It is a weak, insecure position that makes a man
seem unsure of himself no matter how comfortable it may
feel.”112 By extension, this applies to women, too: “[t]he same
thing happens [telegraphing fear] when women ‘comfortably’
fold their arms in front of their breasts.”113 Self-protecting vulnerable areas of the body undermines the argument because
fear and weakness menace the commitment to truth.114
Disordered movement and a high voice are also fatal.115
The weak must hurry, driven on by fear or irrational emotion
of various sorts.116 “Exuberant gesticulation and movement
were characteristic of slaves; a free man does not run, but the
running slave was a stock type.”117 Of course, slaves run because they must at the bidding of others, but there is more at
work than just fear. Thus, one modern commentator recommends:

111. 72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 57.
112. BALL, supra note 76, at 6. “Until the trial advocate is sure of himself and his technique, it is better to make gestures above the waist level.
Gestures made below the waist tend to suggest suppression or debasement
and are more difficult to perform for beginners.” Persons, supra note 78, at
60.
113. BALL, supra note 76, at 6.
114. “Arms crossed in front of the chest is a clear sign that the person . . . feels that they have to protect themselves against further interrogation. Legs crossed can also look defensive and closed. Clenched fists or
hands gripping the arms show tension and an underlying anxiety about the
situation. Hand-wringing reveals an even greater feeling of anxiety.” 2
JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 15.13 [hereinafter JURYWORK].
115. CORBEILL, supra note 73, at 133.
116. See QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.112; Graf, supra note 54, at
49. Pictures on attic vases confirm that individually waving arms is a sign of
both excessive emotion and of fear; the latter, not surprisingly, is also represented through running. These gestures belong to women, children, old men,
and barbarians. See generally, Timothy, J. McNiven, Behaving Like an Other: Telltale Gestures in Athenian Vase Painting, in NOT THE CLASSICAL IDEAL
(Beth Cohen ed., 2005).
117. “[B]ut other violent gestures belong either to slaves or to low class
free-born: shaking the head in anger or being swollen with it; grinding one’s
teeth and slapping the thigh in anger.” Graf, supra note 54, at 49.
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Move about the courtroom very slowly and deliberately. It is important to remember that too
many advocates move with undue haste in court.
Slower movements with feet moving from place
to place and gestures with hands and arms cue to
audience members that I am in control of this
situation.118
A similar problem of control and fear underlies the requirement that the voice be low.119 Ancient audiences were felt
to look upon a low voice as “a sign of courage, a high voice as a
sign of cowardice.”120 Likewise, “[h]igher pitch, in American
culture and American legal culture, is associated with lack of
authority and demeaned as overly emotional.”121 Of course, a
female speaker has a particular problem with this requirement
and the underlying paradigm. Thus, “[i]f you have a naturally
high pitched voice, remember to speak slowly and try to lower
the pitch.”122
118. 84 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, supra note 93, § 71. “Too much movement by
a trial lawyer can be disastrous for an opening statement or closing argument, because it makes the jurors nervous, and it signals the lawyer’s lack of
confidence.” 72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 59.
119. A low voice communicates power. Bernstein, supra note 70, at 65.
Quintilian distinguishes the exercise of an orator’s voice from that of a singer
by comparing the training of the voice to that of a soldier who must march,
carry burdens, mount guard, etc. QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.26.
120. GLEASON, supra note 54, at 83 (citation omitted).
121. Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance Is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law’s Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK.
L. REV. 7, 49-50, 57 n.206 (1998) (citation omitted).
122. DIANA V. PRATT, LEGAL WRITING: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 329 (2d
ed. 1993), cited by Stanchi, supra note 121, at 49 n.206. “Sharp exclamation
injures the voice and likewise jars the hearer, for it has about it something
ignoble, suited rather to feminine outcry than to manly dignity in speaking.”
AD HERENNIUM, supra note 20, at III.xii.22. Emotion and an emotional style
are feminine and contrary to nature. The author recommends a low voice for
debate. Id. at III.xiv.25. Similarly, “the speaker needs to realize that the
best visual and aural qualities do not call attention to themselves.” 72 AM.
JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 14. The best aural quality is “a rich baritone voice.” Id. §18. The writer is a woman, which illustrates how these
norms transcend gender boundaries. The prejudice against shrill voices is
certainly alive:
Who trusts a shrill-voiced trial lawyer? Who has great confidence in a monotone voice, or a breathy voice, or a voice
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Failures of delivery, social status, and self-control are indistinguishable in the dominant elite paradigm. “A man’s lack
of sexual self-control reveals itself in his speech: the incontinent man has a high-pitched voice.”123 Presumably his lack of
control assimilates him to the feminine. Running and movement in general become evidence that “low origin and lack of
self-control obviously go[] together.”124 Too much gesture signifies too little reason; even neutral automatic or repetitive gestures represent slippage of mental control. A modern writer
points out: “A senseless bobbing of the head sends a senseless
subtext.”125 Quintilian makes the point more strongly: “Even
the frequent nodding of the head is not free from fault, while to
toss or roll it till our hair flies free is suggestive of a fanatic.”126
Gestures that seem to respond to bodily, not mental, imperatives are conceptualized as even more revealing:
[T]rial lawyers need to re-think their delivery
patterns, and most advocates need to learn new
muscle memory that will allow them a narrow
range of acceptable gestures. No longer should
with a lisp, or with an irritating high-pitch, or awkward
pausing or added useless sounds (uhh, umm, er)? If we do
not give full credibility to individuals outside the courtroom
with these vocal qualities, we certainly will not give credibility to problem-voiced lawyers inside the courtroom, a
place held in awe by jurors.
81 AM. JUR. TRIALS 317 The Trial Lawyer’s Persuasive Speaking Voice § 1
(2016). See SAYLER & SHADEL, supra note 16, at 119-20, 124-26 (discussing
the problems of pitch and emotion in women).
123. GLEASON, supra note 54, at 83 (footnote omitted). Ekman points
out that in the 1930s, expansive gesticulation was considered characteristic
of “‘inferior races,’ such as the Jews or gypsies, [who] made many large,
sweeping illustrators compared to the ‘superior,’ less gesturally expansive
Aryans.” Ekman, supra note 32, at 105. Likewise, “[s]tereotyping by role
and exaggerated speech and gestures is commonplace and consistent with
images of Blacks historically relied upon by the mass media.” Desiree A.
Kennedy, Marketing Goods, Marketing Images: The Impact of Advertising on
Race, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 615, 654 (2000).
124. Graf, supra note 54, at 49.
125. JULIUS FAST, BODY LANGUAGE IN THE WORK PLACE 65 (1994); HAMLIN,
supra note 109, at 209 (stating that “any gestural habit will, after a time,
look false”). See also People v. Bellucci, No. H023624, 2003 WL 756829, at
*2 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2003).
126. QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.71.
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they wave their hands and arms about led by
whim and the subconscious muscle guidance system. No longer should they stamp about the
courtroom or slouch in their chairs. No longer
should they scratch127 or let their hands fly free.
Jurors are watching everything.128
Gestures outside the elite range are identified as creatures
of individual “whim” and sub-rational “subconscious muscle
guidance” that show that the body, not the mind, is in charge.
Seeing them, the watching jurors assume the worst: irrationality and deception.
III. POPULAR NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION:
ADOPTING AN ALTERNATE PERSUASIVE BODY
A. Rejection by the Dominant Elite Tradition
As this section will show, the elite speaker has a potent rival in the rhetorical tradition: the popular speaker. The popular speaker reverses elite norms to forge a bond with the audience and establish an alternative basis for trust, the invocation
of shared, non-elite experience. Instead of restrained elite demeanor, he adopts expansive gestures, raised voice, increased
movement, informal posture, and informal, rumpled, or disheveled clothing. Such delivery is associated with trials, with challenges to the established order (charging it with deceit or failure), and with defense attorneys. The dominant elite tradition,
which includes almost all surviving classical works and most
modern writers, condemns popular delivery, even while admitting its power and the necessity.129 Thus, the rules and reasons
for popular delivery appear only indirectly in ancient sources.
127. See Appendix.
128. 84 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, supra note 93, § 7 also prohibits pinching or
wiping one’s nose, ear scratching, etc. as clues to “imputation of character” by
the jury. See also HAMLIN, supra note 109, at 209.
129. The impact of elite ideology on the accounts of popular rhetoric has
long been recognized and plays out in the ancient and modern debates over
the actual accomplishments of Cleon, the democratic leader. See, e.g., A.G.
Woodhead, Thucydides’ Portrait of Cleon, 13 MNEMEOSYNE 289, 290-91 (1960).
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Modern sources can be more open to such non-verbal communication, but remain firmly anchored in the ancient popular/elite
dichotomy and its terms. Although popular delivery may be a
rhetorical strategy,130 the tradition insists that, fundamentally,
such non-verbal communication should be avoided and can be
salvaged only when it is a conscious choice by a pedigreed elite
speaker in limited circumstances. Speakers who routinely employ popular delivery, and who are already non-elite speakers,
are emphatically positioned on the wrong side of the traditional
mind/body duality and, thus, destructive of society and justice.131
The terms of rejection of popular non-verbal communication are rooted in power struggles over democracy: the bitterly
contested changes as political power was exercised—or taken—
by lower social classes. The poster boy for everything seen as
wrong with this process, tools, and result was Cleon, the first
demagogue, or populist, politician in democratic Athens, who
secured his power and that of his supporters through new
forms of political appeal, including a very different, and vastly
effective, rhetoric.132 His opponents never tired of painting Cle130. Charges of using popular delivery are political weapons that position an opponent on the wrong side of the body/mind duality, not identifications of ways of speaking. Thus, for example, Cicero both attacked others as
popular speakers and was himself similarly attacked through criticism of delivery and style. See CORBEILL, supra note 73, at 128. For debate explicitly
rooted in classical sources and reflecting many of the assumptions discussed
here over elite rhetoric, as opposed to the “middling,” or more popular rhetoric used by Lincoln and Henry Ward Beecher before the Civil War, see
WINTERER, supra note 15, at 70-74.
131. The elite appropriation of rationality is also reflected in the rules of
evidence, which allows a judge, usually an elite figure, to decide if something
is too emotional for the jury and will overwhelm its, presumably more fragile,
reason. See FED. R. EVID. 403. “[T]he oldest, and still dominant, set of assumptions [is] the “classical” view. Those who subscribe to this viewpoint see
emotions as dangerous forces that are likely to corrupt the fact-finding process by displacing the role of cool, unemotional reason.” Mark Spottswood,
Emotional Fact-Finding, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 41 (2014). “Evidentiary rules
and practices reveal a folk psychological view of emotion, placing it at odds
with reason.” Teneille R. Brown, The Affective Blindness of Evidence Law, 89
DENV. U. L. REV. 47, 47 (2011). However, the folk tradition is a manifestation
of classical struggle rhetoric and political power.
132. Cleon was “the master of a new technology of political power.”
O’REGAN, supra note 40, at 9 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., W. ROBERT
CONNOR, NEW POLITICIANS OF FIFTH-CENTURY ATHENS 116, 119 (1971). Cleon’s delivery mirrored his other rhetorical innovations.
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on as a corrupt social inferior, working to maximize his own
gain and that of the mob who were his supporters.133 In this
picture, Pericles led Athens to glory by uniting the citizens;
Cleon destroyed Athens by dividing them. Pericles was an excellent general; Cleon stole his victories from others.134 And,
above all, Pericles rose above the body and told the truth, however unpalatable; Cleon was mired in the body and devoted to
lies.135
A primary point of attack was Cleon’s methods of nonverbal communication, which embodied his profound break
with the traditional ruling elite. Pericles’ unemotional restraint and bodily immobility, claiming rationality and universal truth, have been discussed above. Cleon’s trademarks were
shouting, vigorous movement, lower-class gestures like slapping the thigh, and disordering his clothing, all of which contributed to his emotional appeals.136 His techniques emphasized his solidarity with the ordinary citizens who could not
forget the requirements and vulnerabilities of the body.137 His
delivery, like his political success, visibly relocated power from
elite speaker to the mass of listeners, assembled as political or
legal decision makers.138 Elite writers associated this relocation
133. See, e.g., ARISTOPHANES, THE KNIGHTS, 40-60 (Loeb Classical Library) (Benjamin B. Rogers trans., 1924), in which Cleon is represented as a
slave corrupting his master, Demos, with food. See THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF
THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 3.36.6 (Rex Warner, trans. 1972), in which Cleon is
identified as the most violent of the citizens and the most persuasive.
134. See, e.g., ARISTOPHANES, supra note 133, at 1-55. The opening scene represents Nicias and Demosthenes, two Athenian generals, claiming that
Paphlagon, the Cleon character, has lied and claimed credit for their victories; the slaves consider running away (that is, deserting) as a result. Id. at
20-30.
135. For Thucydides’ contrast of Pericles and Cleon, see HARRY YUNIS,
TAMING DEMOCRACY, 59-86 (1996). Modern historians differ on factual accuracy of these ancient accounts; however, that does not alter their impact as
ideological positions. See MARTIN OSTWALD, FROM POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY TO
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LAW: LAW, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS IN FIFTH-CENTURY
ATHENS 202 (1986).
136. For Cleon’s yelling, see ARISTOPHANES, supra note 133, at 135-36;
PLUTARCH, NICIAS VIII.3 (Loeb Classical Library) (Bernadotte Perrin trans.,
1967). Cleon is accused of first using used licentiousness and buffoonery to
delight the Athenians. PLUTARCH, NICIAS III.1, VIII.3.
137. ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, §1359b.
138. PLATO, GORGIAS § 456, supra note 127; O’REGAN, supra note 40, at
12.
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of power with a menace to truth. Deprived of its individual
guarantor, that is, the elite speaker, truth is threatened by
mob violence. For the elite tradition, Cleon’s body language reflected not a different understanding of how to arrive at decisions, but a failure of character, his and his audience’s.139 Both
speaker and audience were characterized as closer to slaves
and women than rational men.140 Such “persuasion” relied not
on truth and reason, but need and satisfaction.141 Within this
paradigm, it was not surprising that Cleon is conceptualized as
initiating the destruction of the arena for rational discourse
and, thus, the destruction of Athens.142
The remarkable stability of both forms of popular delivery
and their evaluation within the elite rhetorical paradigm is evidenced in rhetorical “history.” The first Roman politician to
appeal directly to the mass of the citizens was, like Cleon, notable “both for the vehemence of his speech and his complementary innovations in delivery: he was the first to pull his toga aside to free his left arm for gesture, the first to pace along
the Rostra.”143 His successor, another (in)famous popular
speaker, is credited with introducing the famous thigh slap to
Roman oratory.144 The account proceeds with the typical elite
characterization of popular delivery, as nature, not skill, and
139. This trend begins in Thucydides and Aristophanes and continues
in influential assessments of the period. For the opposition between Pericles
and those who followed, first of all Cleon, in terms of character, see
PLUTARCH, PERICLES, supra note 59, at XXXIX; NICIAS, supra note 135, at III.
140. See e.g., ARISTOPHANES, supra note 133, passim. The play represents Cleon as a slave who is finally outdone by an even more degraded person, a sausage seller who can cater even better to his master’s stomach. Id.
141. Sophistic, popular speakers like Cleon were mocked as speaking/farting through their assholes, an image that continues today. O’REGAN,
supra note 40, at 59.
142. Id. at 9-11.
143. ROBERT MORSTEIN-MARX, MASS ORATORY AND POLITICAL POWER IN
LATE REPUBLICAN ROME 271 (2004) (discusses the more expansive delivery of
popular speakers appealing to the masses). See also Elaine Fantham, Quintilian on Performance: Traditional and Personal Elements in “Institutio” 11.3,
36 PHOENIX 243 (1982). The speaker is Caius Gracchus, who is explicitly
compared to Cleon in PLUTARCH, TIBERIUS GRACCHUS II.2 in TIBERIUS & CAIUS
GRACCHUS (Loeb Classical Library) (Bernadotte Perrin trans., 1921).
144. See Fantham, supra note 143, at 259 (discussing the ancient
sources of this lore).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/1

30

2017

EYING THE BODY TO FIND TRUTH

409

mingles belly and speech, discussing table manners, diction,
character, temper, tone, and, finally, vulnerability, flight, and
death.145
The contest between elite delivery, rationality, justice, and
truth on the one hand, and popular delivery, irrationality, mob
violence, and injustice on the other, animates one common understanding of trial. It was first articulated in the most influential trial scene in our tradition: Plato’s account of Socrates’
trial and conviction.146 Socrates’ demeanor positions him firmly on the positive side of the mind/body duality—and his prosecutors and the jury on the other. He dies because he rejected
“effrontery and impudence and . . . refused to address [the jurors] in the way which would give [them] most pleasure . . . doing or saying all sorts of things.”147 He ignores the
jurors’ ordinary concerns, fear, favor, and even death, and cares
only for public good.148 He refuses to appeal to the jurors’ emotions, to make “passionate appeals,” or to “stage[] pathetic
scenes” that would reduce justice to a personal favor, rather
than transcendent value.149 The speech that would have wooed
the jury would be the speech of a slave or women150 shaped by
physical vulnerability and, thus, deceptive and inconstant. Instead, Socrates’ truthfulness and his physical and emotional
immobility are one: having taken his stand, he will not budge,
a claim explicitly compared to his unyielding stance in battle.151
The moving image of a lone, immobile man, associated with rational truth, and his hyperactive, irrational persecutors, sustains elite rhetoric and its trademark delivery as the only morally viable option. It naturalizes elite delivery, and all of its
class-related claims, as virtue, and discredits democratic rhetoric along with the jury, a much-contested innovation of demo145. PLUTARCH, TIBERIUS GRACCHUS supra note 143, at II.2-5; CAIUS
GRACCHUS, supra note 142, at XVII.
146. “A typological smear that tied unmoderated democracy to unreason
was planted by Plato in the representation of Socrates’ condemnation by a
people’s court.” John Henderson, The Runabout: A Volume Retrospect, in THE
CAMBRIDGE GUIDE TO ANCIENT RHETORIC 282 (Erik Gunderson ed., 2009).
147. PLATO, supra note 25, § 38d-e. See also § 28b, 34c.
148. Id. § 22e-23b, 25c, 30d.
149. Id. § 37a , 35b-c.
150. Id. § 35b, 38e.
151. Id. § 28d-e, 38e.
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cratic Athens. Plato’s undisputed rhetorical mastery positions
elite strategy as rejection of rhetoric and the “natural” truthfulness of authentic men.
B. Embracing Other Demeanors for Persuasion and
Alternative Truths
However, popular delivery’s power, particularly when arguing the “weaker” side, that is, arguing against the established/political social classes and state or institutional structures,152 was, and is, unarguable. Without abandoning the link
between character and delivery, rhetorical advice also recognizes popular delivery as a strategy—risky, but sometimes necessary, and particularly suited to jury trial or other venues in
which the audience is conceptualized as non-elite and, thus, potentially less rational.153 For example, after recommending
elite demeanor, the authors of Trial Communication Skills
point that popular delivery has its place with a story of adversarial successes:

152. In Rome, non-elite delivery signified “‘breaking of ranks,’ taking up
a position just a bit, but significantly, askew of the ‘suits’ of the senatorial order.” MORSTEIN-MARX, supra note 143, at 273 (footnote omitted). Adoption of
trademark gestures of non-elite delivery sent a clear message. “By not avoiding behavior specifically marked in his society as feminine, Caesar could be
perceived as transgressing normal modes of male, aristocratic behavior. In
violating the accepted relationship between appearance and reality, Caesar
fashions himself as a proponent of political change.” CORBEILL, supra note
73, at 137. Rideout discusses how different persona and voice are in a Supreme Court dissent than in a majority opinion. Yet, as he observes, only
those of impeccable elite legal standing, Supreme Court Justices, can deviate
successfully from the standard legal voice; others, he implies, would be
charged with irrationality and failure of disciplined legal self. Rideout, supra
note 49, at 103-04.
153. Wetlaufer points out that “good lawyers, good judges are attentive
to a range of persuasive possibilities broader than that here identified as the
discipline-specific rhetoric of law” and identifies this broader range with
“passion,” ties this to the “rhetoric of politics,” and associates it with “speech
to his jury under circumstances where such a speech may be useful or necessary.” Wetlaufer, supra note 6, at 1562-63. “In speaking to this jury, the
good judge, like the effective trial lawyer, will depart from the customary
rhetoric of law.” Id. Thus, he ties his analysis of legal rhetoric to the ancient
dichotomy of elite reason and popular irrationality while also, in a traditional
move, justifying it as strategy if undertaken by an elite figure. See also id. at
1596.
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In the late 1960s, clients of William Kunstler did
not expect him to behave like a typical establishment lawyer. They wanted him to make a
personal if flamboyant statement to flout what
they felt was improperly exercised authority. A
young lawyer from Marin County, California told
the authors that she once dared to go into court
in jeans . . . . It was the jury I wanted to reach.
They were all young, most of them counterculture types, and I knew they’d react negatively
to a suit or even a dress. I know the jeans swung
the case in my favor. This kind of approach
would be ridiculous in most areas, but, again, it
was a case of her projecting an image with which
the jury could identify.154
Her delivery is a choice, not a character trait. These highly
skilled attorneys manipulate the repertoire of popular delivery
in gesture, dress, and voice to build persuasion and support the
argument they are using.
The observation that non-verbal communication can take
various forms as needed is profoundly risky for the elite paradigm and the legal system it supports. The practical considerations mask deeper, contested philosophies about the origin and
status of truth. Embedded in the notion of choice among strategies is an assessment of speech quite at odds with the elite
universalizing linkage of one delivery, one credibility, one rationality, and one truth. Rooting communication in persuasion
to which all are subject, and tying delivery to that paradigm,
challenges all these notions.155 The clash of perspectives is ancient: Plato and Aristotle report that delivery, as a topic, was
first associated with the sophists,156 notorious believers in the
relativity or unavailability of truth and the unfettered force of
154. ARON ET AL., supra note 90, § 4.08.
155. This may be echoed in the “agonizing simplistic” debate over
whether decision making by judges and juries should involve suppression of
emotion. Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of Judicial Empathy, 96 MINN. L. REV.
1944, 1945 (2012). See Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of
Judicial Dispassion, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 629, 630, 633-41 (2011).
156. ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, § 1404a, links delivery’s importance to
the sophists, beginning with Thrasymachus.
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persuasion in the human world.157 Modern proponents of popular delivery agree: “Persuasion is the purpose of trial communication.”158 “Since advocacy uses persuasion rather than direct
physical force, . . . the other party . . . must be led to want to do
what the advocate is seeking.”159
Popular expansive gesticulation and non-elite vocal tones
aim at providing an alternative mechanism of credibility,
shared experience and a claim of affiliation. Modern popular
practice replicates ancient patterns.160 Within the popular

157. The sophists, teachers of rhetoric to all in the newly democratic
Athens, based persuasion on a notion of relative truth. The elite linkage of
delivery, the sophists, the body, self-interest, the masses, and multiple, mortal truths form the opposite pole to elite claims to unitary, transcendent
truth, accessible to a few. See G.B. KERFERD, THE SOPHISTIC MOVEMENT 83110 (1981); WILLIAM GUTHRIE, THE SOPHISTS 176-225 (1971). The notion of
strategic choice as the basis for persuasion is embedded in kairos or speech
appropriate for the moment, a trademark innovation. See GUTHRIE, supra
note 157, at 272.
158. However, the writer continues to relink persuasion and justice as
most effective: “In order to be able to persuade, the trial attorney must be
personally convinced that he or she is fulfilling a mission, the role of the advocate in achieving justice. It is the advocate’s duty to perform this mission
with conscience because advocacy without conscience is like a body without a
soul.” ARON ET AL., supra note 90, at 1-26. See below on the role of the soul
here.
159. RICHARD A. GIVENS, ADVOCACY: THE ART OF PLEADING A CAUSE
§ 1.03, Supplement Appendix 16-2, § 10 (3d ed., 1992). The concept is ancient. Sophists imagined persuasion as a form of force to advertising the importance of their instruction in persuasive speaking in democratic institutions. See O’REGAN, supra note 40, at 11-21. Givens also focuses on the
concept of alignment as the persuasive strategy:
Witnesses, advocates, political figures, and sales personnel
succeed and are sometimes convincing despite obvious clues
indicating that they are dishonest, because the audience
wants to believe them. An effective witness or advocate
must accordingly seek to align their presentation with the
interests of the tribunal to the extent feasible. Honesty,
while in itself an advantage . . . must be combined with effective presentation and alignment with the anticipated reaction of those who are to act on the basis of the presentation.
GIVENS, supra note 159, at Supplement § 2.02. Note the nod toward honesty
as a rhetorical advantage.
160. See MORSTEIN-MARX, supra note 143, at 272-73 (noting that Cicero
records that the Roman populace loved the name, speech, face and gait of the
popular orators).
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paradigm of non-verbal communication, the central question is
“will you be recognizable to the jurors as human, like them? As
you proceed logically, in cool control, . . . can you also come
across as a feeling and fallible human being?”161 “For jurors to
relate to you, you must show them you know about all of life –
as they do – not just an isolated, powerful, unfamiliar corner
[the legal profession].”162 Thus, popular delivery embraces
many alternatives and parades different bodies, explicitly referencing age, sex, class, race, and other markers of non-elite affiliation. “To increase the momentum of the similarity principle, clothing choices, word usage, and behaviors should be
similar to those of the jurors to a certain extent. . . . The goal is
to create perceived homophyly (perceived similarity) between
counsel, client, and jurors.”163
Popular rhetoric in approach, and particularly in delivery,
embraces a multifaceted notion of human life. The reversal
from the rules of elite delivery could not be more clear. As one
writer advising popular delivery acknowledges: “movement in
the courtroom is controversial” and restricted; frequently judges require the attorney to stand in one place.164 Judges’ “reasons why movement is restricted [are]: ‘more dignified’, ‘more
serious,’ ‘not so distracting,’ ‘not too intimidating to witnesses.’”165 The author emphatically rejects these with the claim
that “[m]ovement is life.”166 “Is the lectern and all it connotes a
more reassuring image for the jury to focus on than a human
being? . . . Does this give the client the best chance for his lawyers to be at the top of their form?”167 Popular delivery, with

161. HAMLIN, supra note 109, at 9. Note the attempt to fuse the underlying claim of elite rhetoric with popular strategies.
162. Id. (emphasis omitted).
163. SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 70, at 15. The authors work along
a credibility/authority versus approachability/likeability/similarity axis, with
advice about how to become more approachable that includes things like less
formal attire. Id. at 57-64 (with checklists). Similarity to the jury is also important. Id. at 177.
164. HAMLIN, supra note 109, at 215-16 (emphasis omitted).
165. Id. at 216.
166. Id. (emphasis omitted).
167. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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its gestures,168 movement, voice,169 and clothes,170 showcases
“life.” This experience shared with the audience underlies its
credibility.171
C. Rational Citizens and Irrational Mobs: Elite
Charges of Pandering
The “life” or common experiences that found the appeal of
popular delivery are read by the elite tradition as particularized, bodily, and, thus, irrational and self-interested. While the
notion of strategy may be used to root the popular speaker’s actions in rationality, no such mechanism salvages the audience.
From the beginning of the elite tradition, attention to delivery
– which means any non-verbal communication style except
elite delivery—is linked to awakening emotions and, thus, to
irrationality and corruption of the audience.172 Effective popular speech is explained by a formulaic charge of pandering, accomplishing its goals by indicating “aspects of the situation
which will make it in the other party’s interest to do what the
advocate wants to see done.”173 The elite view has sunk deep
168. Gesture must be added if not present, but it should appear natural.
Hamlin recommends exercises to discover natural gestures that can be cultivated. Id. at 745-46. Likeability is promoted by gestures with the palm up.
SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 70, at 76.
169. Voice, loudness, and accent are all important in establishing credibility with a popular audience. Loudness is more credible in jury trials.
SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 70, at 137, 305.
170. Trial manuals give much advice on clothes. Critical for popular
delivery is the advice “[d]on’t emphasize your differences from them [jurors].”
HAMLIN, supra note 109, at 239. Unbuttoning the suit jacket has been identified as a “rewarding” behavior that will increase jury good will. SMITH &
MALANDRO, supra note 70, at 74. The same types of advice are given for reading jurors’ clothes. See Herald Price Fahringer, “Mirror, Mirror on the
Wall. . .”: Body Language, Intuition, and the Art of Jury Selection, 17 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 197, 200 (1993). Dress and mind are taken as potentially
equivalent: “Clothes slapped together in a vulgar, helter-skelter fashion may
indicate careless analysis.” Id.
171. Studies rating speakers with and without gestures have indicated
that a person who wishes to be perceived as clear should use few gestures,
but a “person who wants to be positively perceived and appreciated for interpersonal qualities . . . should adopt a speech style using an abundance of gestures.” B. Rimé & L. Schiaratura, Gesture and Speech, in FUNDAMENTALS OF
NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR 239, 276 (R. S. Feldman & B. Rimé eds., 1991).
172. ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, §1404a.
173. GIVENS, supra note 159, § 1.03, Supplement Appendix 16-2, § 10.
Regarding jurors’ interests:
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into the popular imagination. One professor has summed up
her students’ views as:
Juries are always swayed by irrational appeals,
in part, because it is passions and animus and
emotion to which the lawyers play in order to get
their clients off or to win huge sums in tort
claims or in some other, usually dubious, cause.
Lawyers, the aristocrats, helping us to stand
somewhat above the fray so that the law might
have room to work? You’ve got to be kidding!
Lawyers pander to the mob mentality, they don’t
oppose it. That’s a pretty fair summary of how
things tend to go.174
Elite, non-verbal communication promises rationality in
the speaker and promotes an answering rationality in the audience. “[I]f a lawyer’s looks are ‘correct,’ that lawyer will leave
the jurors emancipated in a strange way, free to judge the case
on other criteria.”175 In contrast, confronted by deviation from
the elite norm, the jurors cease to concentrate on argument and
instead concentrate on the speakers: “his nose hairs, . . . his
dandruff, or his confusing red tie, or her fuzzy hair, or her
knees, or her dangling earrings.”176 While the jurors could be
simply distracted, the terms of their distraction are revealing.

[t]he trial lawyer should . . . ask[] “Which needs are the
most crucial to jurors?” For example, counsel might ask, do
the jurors seem motivated by the need for security? Then
counsel will try relating his or her appeal to the jurors to
their desire for safety. Another technique is to try coupling
lesser needs to a great need, for researchers say that “bundled needs” have more success. For example, bundling the
need for safety with the need for self-respect might be effective.
72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 65. “[I]f you can tap into the jury’s
self-interest you create an attentive, willing, thoughtful audience – motivated
to listen.” HAMLIN, supra note 109, at 22.
174. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Law and the Moral Life, 11 YALE J. L. &
HUMAN. 383, 389 (1999).
175. 72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 44.
176. Id.
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The speakers who are within the elite norm disappear; they
leave behind what looks like disembodied speech. However,
speakers who transgress the norm, particularly in ways clearly
identifiable as popular—excessive and personal costume or intrusive bodies—have the opposite effect. Words and content
disappear, foregrounding, instead, the improper body of a particular individual. The association of low class, emotional appeals, and irrationality appears in familiar advice about how to
speak to various social groups. “The nature of the summation
is based on the intensity of the emotional impact to be conveyed
to the particular jury type that you are facing. A conservative
upper class jury will not be persuaded by a summation loaded
with emotional impact. On the other hand, a blue-collar-type
jury is more likely to react favorably toward an emotional
summation . . . .”177
The ancient cultural narrative that listeners may flip from
rational “good juror” to irrational “bad juror” under the pressure of non-elite persuasive strategy provides the underpinnings for the changing evaluations of jurors that Leubsdorf has
shown justify the Rules of Evidence.178 Assumptions built into
our legal tradition, including the mutually exclusive nature of
rationality and emotion, along with an ideological division of
reason and emotion between judge (and the elite in general)
177. SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 70, at 755. Similarly, judges are
associated with rationality and juries with bodily emotionality. “For example, in bench trials, the target is the head of the fact-finder; in jury trials, the
heart of each juror is the mark.” ARON ET AL., supra note 90, § 19.02. “I have
seen some lawyers who think it is effective to pander to emotion. I think this
is a mistake in a jury trial, but it is particularly dangerous in a court trial.”
Robert E. Cartwright, Jr., “Bench Trial Acumen”—To Bench or Not To
Bench—That is the Question, Address Before Association of Trial Lawyers of
America Winter Convention (2004), in WINTER 2004 ATLA-CLE 93, at 6.
Yet there is little evidence that judges actually disregard emotion more readily than juries. Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About
How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 27 (1997).
178. The phrases “good juror” and “bad juror” are from Leubsdorf, supra
note 7, at 1248. The elite tradition’s successful framing of rhetorical choices
as expressive of rationality and irrationality in speaker and audience parallels Leubsdorf’s third presupposition that “law is justified by ambivalent and
contrary distinctions between reason and emotion, and between the strengths
and weaknesses of jurors, distinctions that turn out to be based less on reality than on the structural requirements of trials.” Id. at 1212. “That structure gives certain roles to jurors and others to judges and then assigns them
strengths and weaknesses appropriate to their roles.” Id. at 1253.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/1

38

2017

EYING THE BODY TO FIND TRUTH

417

and jury, or the non-elite,179 facilitate reduction of juries’ power
and dismissal of disfavored jury verdicts as irrational, rather
than competing truths, particularly when the case involves
non-elite jurors,180 parties, or other participants. The speaker
is conceptualized as reaching his personal goals – usually identified as winning at all costs—through tactics that transform
his audience. “The explanation for [a] legally inexplicable decision lies in the defense’s ability to pander to the fears of the jury,”181 “to obtain a favorably biased jury, and if deemed necessary, to suggest evidence and argumentation that panders to
the basest emotions of the jurors.”182 This dispenses with
“truth and justice.”183 The dichotomy, its justifications, and its
consequences fall squarely within classical, elite paradigm of
rhetoric.
IV. VENUES OF ELITE ENFORCEMENT
The extent to which elite delivery successfully occupies the
positive pole of traditional dualities—nature, not art; mind, not
body; universal, not particular; and finally, virtuous, not vicious—justifies and perpetuates a regime of inculcation and
discipline in legal institutions.
179. Mark Spottswood, Emotional Fact-Finding, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 41,
42 (2014) (citations omitted). He collects citations illustrating that the dichotomy is duplicated in the scholarly literature on trial and evidence. Id. at
46-57. He also traces the negative view of emotions back to Aristotle. Id. at
47. See Brown, supra note 131, at 60-61 (summarizing the history of the association of reason with judges).
180. Similarly, as juries changed from exclusively “reasonable men” to
include traditionally marginalized racial and ethnic groups and women, they
were perceived differently. Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves:
The Power, Perception, and Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325,
336-41 (1995). An increasing number of rules restricted their power and
transferred it to the judge, typically a male member of the elite. “Allowing
the judge to define rationality, by giving him the ability to set aside jury verdicts he considers irrational, implies that juries, like women, tend toward the
irrational, and must constantly be monitored.” Id. at 328 (citations omitted).
181. Aaron Goldstein, Note, Race, Reasonableness, and the Rule of Law,
76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2003).
182. Franklin Strier, Paying the Piper: Proposed Reforms of the Increasingly Bountiful but Controversial Profession of Trial Consulting, 44 S.D. L.
REV. 699, 707 (1998-99).
183. “Trial consultants, however, are under no more constraint to seek
truth and justice than are the attorneys they assist.” Id. at 708.
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A. Acquiring the Language and the Elite Body of the
Law: Law School
Just as learning to think like a lawyer involves jettisoning
languages of social class, ethnic origin, and so forth, learning to
act like a lawyer involves jettisoning previous methods of nonverbal communication. This is part of our tradition. Training
in rhetoric was the backbone of education throughout the Roman world.184 It promoted acquisition of mental and physical
practices that were conceptually and practically standard, regardless of the speaker’s origin.185 The rigorous course of study
incorporated elite advantage, yet provided the primary vehicle
for changes in status by those not part of the Roman elite.186
Study of rhetoric “effected its own distinctive transformation of
the student . . . [that] often entailed a permanent migration
from one culture to another . . . and . . . encompassed attitudes,
practices, and beliefs, indeed the student’s very sense of self”
that made it “a process of acculturation.”187 All were required
to undergo extensive, and often brutal, practice of their oral
and reasoning skills before audiences of their peers and experienced speakers; only a tiny fraction would ever use the skills in
the courts.188 Further, the tradition’s strong assertion of the
184. HABINEK, supra note 14, at 60-61.
185. Id. at 67. For an elite educational focus on physical deportment,
see CORBEILL, supra note 73, at 124, who points out the connection with
Bourdieu’s theory of habitus. See also FROST, supra note 14, at 615-16.
186. CORBEILL, supra note 73, at 122, 123.
187. HABINEK, supra note 14, at 61. Wetlaufer argues that “our particular rhetorical conventions and commitments . . . constitute our selves[sic], our
communities, and, perhaps, our world. . . . Those commitments bear not just
upon how we say the things we say but also upon what we say, on what we
are able to see, on what we are able to think, on what we are able to know
and believe, and on who we are able to be.” Wetlaufer, supra note 6, at 1548
(emphasis added).
188. “Rhetoric was the calisthenics of manhood.” GLEASON, supra note
54, at xxii.
For a discussion of the masculine rhetorical ideal, see
GUNDERSON, supra note 54, at ch. 2; HABINEK, supra note 14, at 67; and Connolly, supra note 105, at 134. Thus, Quintilian starts with the training of a
boy and ends with a man. QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at I.pr. 5-8. Gleason
comments, “the art of self-presentation through rhetoric entailed much more
than mastery of words: physical control of one’s voice, carriage, facial expression, and gesture, control of one’s emotions under conditions of competitive
stress—in a word all the arts of deportment necessary.” GLEASON, supra note
54, at xxii.
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connection between elite education, including delivery, and
personal morality meant that training in the rules of nonverbal persuasion was considered to train the character.189
Conscious incarnation of the restrictions of elite delivery was a
process assumed to fortify the mind with rational control over
the body and passion.190 Departure from the elite model was
remarked, ridiculed, and punished at every level of Roman education and practice.191
Acculturation explicitly continues as a model for law
schools,192 where physical and mental remodeling of students
occurs in tandem. Within this paradigm, as shown above, the
elite delivery of the warrior remains the norm. Although for
some students this elite demeanor is more foreign than for others, its acquisition by all students is a primary focus of law
school classrooms and skills training. Students acquire a new
set of mental and physical professional habits that seem mutually entailing. Proper elite deportment is conceptualized as
tightly linked with professional formation, with legal rationality, and with proper character—in fact, as one and the same.193
189. For the study of oratory as the study of virtue, see QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at I.pr. 12, 179; Catherine Atherton, Children, Animals, Slaves,
and Grammar, in PEDAGOGY AND POWER: RHETORICS OF CLASSICAL LEARNING
229-41 (Yun Lee Too & Niall Livingston eds., 1998) (discussing the Roman
view of education, culminating in rhetoric, as moral training that, not surprisingly, distinguished free citizens from slaves). See also Teresa Morgan,
Quintilian’s Political Theory, in PEDAGOGY AND POWER 249 (Yun Lee Too &
Niall Livingston eds., 1998) (discussing Quintilian’s education of an orator as
aimed at virtue).
190. See GLEASON, supra note 54, at 72; Connolly, supra note 105, at
134; Gunderson, supra note 54, at 171-73.
191. Quintilian records persistent jokes passed down in the tradition at
the expense of elite speakers who got carried away and ventured too far into
the realm of unsanctioned popular delivery. See, e.g., QUINTILIAN, supra note
20, at XI.iii 126, 129.
192. “Training lawyers is a process of enculturation.” Adam Babich, Essay on the Political Dimension of Clinics: The Apolitical Law School Clinic, 11
CLINICAL L. REV. 447, 452 (2005). “Integrating the narrow notion of ‘thinking
like a lawyer’ is important for students as it initiates them into the world of
the law in contemporary American society. It is, in essence (and for lack of a
better term), an indoctrination into the world of adversarialism and advocacy.” David T. Butleritchie, Situating “Thinking like a Lawyer” within Legal
Pedagogy, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29, 31 (2002-03).
193. The claim that law schools do not inculcate virtue to the extent desired means that instruction in the law is conceived of as instruction in virtue
and (re)formation of character. “We convey and inculcate some variety of
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Law schools celebrate remodeling students’ minds.
“Learning to think like a lawyer” is a clear institutional goal.194
The process, as Mertz and others have pointed out, pushes to
the margins differences in “experience” and “actual structure of
voices heard” that derive from “race, gender, class, or other aspects of social identity.”195 Students’ attention is reoriented to
abstract, formalizing accounts that focus on questions of authority and translate particular life-events into “a shared rhetoric, legal language that generates an appearance of neutrality.”196 The students are pushed to acquire a professional
“voice.” The optimistic understanding of this process is that,
through it, students join the legal discourse community.197
moral and ethical sensibilities when we induce our students to take up legal
thinking. We are always teaching more than law when we teach students to
think like lawyers.” James R. Elkins, Thinking Like a Lawyer: Second
Thoughts, 47 MERCER L. REV. 511, 540 (1996). A familiar role is assigned to
clinical courses or skills activities: inculcating ethics “is done by having a
lawyer living out the rules of ethics in the actual practice of law before students’ eyes, and then insisting that those students live them out before hers.”
Robert P. Schuwerk, The Law Professor as Fiduciary: What Duties Do We
Owe to Our Students, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 753, 786 (2004).
194. Like all acculturation, the process provides more than technical
knowledge. “Law school students not only learn to ‘think like lawyers’ in
terms of analytical technique, but also begin to internalize the four core values that define the legal profession: (1) integrity, (2) competence, (3) respect
for the rule of law, and (4) loyalty to clients.” Babich, supra note 192, at 452
(citations omitted). Thinking like a lawyer means abandoning ways of interpreting reality that involve social, gender, racial, cultural, or economic differences from the prevailing model. See generally Stanchi, supra note 121;
Brook K. Baker, Language Acculturation Processes and Resistance to
In”Doctrine”ation in the Legal Skills Curriculum and Beyond: A Commentary
on Mertz’s Critical Anthropology of the Socratic, Doctrinal Classroom, 34 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 131 (2000). The student acquires the common sense and
the common body of the lawyer, and they are mutually reinforcing. See Robert Dingwall, Language, Law, and Power: Ethnomethodology, Conversation,
Analysis, and the Politics of Law and Society Studies, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
885, 893 (2000).
195. Elizabeth Mertz, Teaching Lawyers the Language of Law: Legal
and Anthropological Translations, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 91, 112-13 (2000).
See ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL 211-12 (2007).
196. MERTZ, supra note 195, at 109. For legal reading as a cultural
product, see generally M.H. Hoeflich, The Lawyer as Pragmatic Reader: The
History of Legal Common-Placing, 55 ARK. L. REV. 87 (2002).
197. “[O]ne purpose, at least, of legal academia is to empower law students . . . to join the discourse community of law beyond law school.” Susan
L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, and Entering the Discourse of
Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489, 491 n.13 (2002).
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“[T]hrough subtle reframing of language structure and ideology
imparted by their professors, [the students’] own voices shift,
and as they undergo a reorientation towards spoken and written language, they achieve new identities as lawyers.”198 The
new orientation elides, and is intended to elide, their differences as they are molded to the common pattern. A standard
feature of classroom practice is, of course, testing these mental
and rhetorical patterns orally before a professional audience.
Learning to think like a lawyer is coupled with learning to
act like one, that is, like an elite warrior. Law colleges affirm
in practice and pedagogy the surviving, ancient link between
rationality and elite decorum, and, more covertly, between irrationality and other forms of non-verbal communication. The
standard Socratic method in the first-year classes begins to inculcate elite posture and restraint. From the first day, students are expected to adopt a professional demeanor as they
respond to often aggressive questioning unemotionally, frequently standing, facing the professor, physically quiet, as they
learn how to manipulate doctrine. The method is justified as
reproducing the courtroom.199 Physical training continues in
198. MERTZ, supra note 195, at 116. Mertz also argues that “the Socratic method . . . may continue to linger because of a symbolic ‘fit’ between the
form and function of language.” Id. at 100. Similarly, legal writing is conceptualized as reshaping the language and, thus, at least the professional, self of
students “in teaching novice legal writers, we are not only teaching voice, but
in that process we are also constructing a self—the self of a legal writer.”
Rideout, supra note 49, at 67 (emphasis omitted).
199. Dingwall states:
The classroom mimics the law court with a confrontation
between students and teacher in which students are required to talk as if they were counsel and the teacher
switches between responding like a difficult judge and giving a situated commentary on the adequacy of the students’
talk. Success occurs when students can do “being a lawyer,”
talking through their point in the way that a practitioner
would. The public nature of this confrontation, often described by students as humiliating, mimics the public accountability of the courtroom. This goes right down to the
listening demanded of other students, who may be called on
without notice to take up the point, which anticipates the
listening demanded of opposing counsel, monitoring examinations for objectionable practices.
Dingwall, supra note 194, at 900-01. See Michael Vitiello, Teaching Effective
Oral Argument Skills: Forget About the Drama Coach, 75 MISS. L.J. 869
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the typical first-year oral advocacy competition, usually an appellate argument, which includes instruction in demeanor, gesture, posture, dress, gaze, and voice.200 In addition, clinics,201
moot court,202 and other types of apprenticeship and initiation
experiences prepare or require all students to acquire a set of
highly specific, standardized practices identified as “universal”
and the physical attributes of rationality and, at the same time,
the marks of professional lawyering. The body must be represented as a precondition of legal practice. “[S]omeone who
has not mastered the art of presenting himself or herself
properly has not conquered the confusing and difficult art of
performing in the courtroom as a successful lawyer.”203 Proper
representation of the self is the first step in the ability to represent others. Overwhelmingly, students are taught that proper
demeanor is elite and punished for departures from it.204
Instruction in oral advocacy and judging of student advo(2006) (arguing that the Socratic method enhances oral argument skills).
200. See, e.g., LAUREL CURRIE OATES ET AL., JUST BRIEFS 263-64 (2d ed.
2013); MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 27374 (3d ed. 2010).
201. The literature repeats the claim that students will not know how to
“be” attorneys without association with elders. See QUINTILIAN, supra note
20, at XI.iii.10.
202. Moot court “emphasize[s] that to communicate as a lawyer—to be
heard—the writer or speaker must become a member of the culture and
community of legal practice.” Stanchi, supra note 121, at 8 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). “The constricting rules governing appearance for
women contain deeply ingrained stereotypes about women, their sexuality,
and their competence.” Mairi N. Morrison, May It Please Whose Court?: How
Moot Court Perpetuates Gender Bias in the “Real World” of Practice, 6 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 49, 59 (1995).
203. 72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 44. Morrison comments:
the intricate customs of the club often coalesce to make the
identity of the oral advocate more important than the argument she is making. . . . [S]he does have control over conformity or lack of conformity to customs. It is these customs
that separate those who belong to the club from the outsider. Such a separation may affect the perceived credibility of
the advocate and, therefore, the power of the argument.
Morrison, supra note 202, at 65.
204. Cf. Penelope Pether, Measured Judgments: Histories, Pedagogies,
and the Possibility of Equity, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 489, 527-29 (2002) (commenting on the “elite male student body that is now deployed to discipline
those embodied differently”).
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cates focuses on elite delivery. It begins with the traditional
choice of appellate advocacy,205 which is asserted to privilege
legal rationality. This choice eliminates the need for students
to consider any strategic advantages of popular delivery (and
the negative values associated with it), although later in their
law school career some students may be exposed to trial advocacy after the elite orientation is formed.206 Comments from
the legal professionals who evaluate student performance in
oral advocacy focus, first of all, on physical presentation.207
Small deviations from the elite norm are immediately reproved,
for example, slouching, pacing, rocking or tapping of the feet,
touching the face, pen tapping, head tossing, and the like. Students are warned that they must look straight at the judges at
all times and gesture in moderation, neither too much nor not
enough. All the while, students are told to look natural; this
will be their new nature as attorneys. In a concession to the
strategic advantage of popular delivery and also to reassure
students that the law has some place for them, students with
animated delivery are often told that they should consider trial
work – something that appears later, if at all, in most students’
law school careers.
The fact that judges’ comments so frequently address
presentation rather than content might be explained as indul205. Oral argument is the capstone of the vast majority of first-year legal writing classes. The 2014 legal writing survey of the first year curriculum showed that 125/176 schools taught appellate argument, 84/176 taught
pretrial motion argument, and 45/176 taught trial motion argument (some
schools teach more than one type of argument). ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRS. &
LEGAL WRITING INST., REPORT OF THE ANNUAL LEGAL WRITING SURVEY (2014),
http://www.alwd.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/2014-Survey-ReportFinal.pdf.
206. No school reported teaching oral advocacy in the context of jury or
bench trials. Id. The focus was exclusively on motions or appeals. Id. Trial
advocacy can start in later years with mock trial or moot trial programs or
specific trial practice programs.
207. “The starting point for a good critique is understanding what an
excellent argument should look and sound like.” Barbara Kritchevsky, Judging: The Missing Piece of the Moot Court Puzzle, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 45, 67
(2006). Standard attention to gaze, voice, gestures, etc., follows, although the
writer does insist, after beginning with delivery, that substance is more important, and warns that inexperienced judges focus largely on technique. See
id. at 67-73. The primary focus on delivery has certainly been true in my experience in almost fifteen years of watching judges provide feedback to student advocates.
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gence toward students’ limited knowledge of legal rules. However, another way to understand it is that skilled practitioners
willing to contribute to the profession by judging and training
students perceive elite demeanor not as an add-on, but as the
ground from which recognizable rational legal argument
emerges, as well as a condition of the coherence of the legal
field.208 Oral argument is not only about allowing students to
reason, but also allowing them to practice as attorneys in space
and develop credible professional bodies that identify them, in
their own eyes and those of others, as attorneys.209 Not surprisingly, as students progress, they begin to look and sound
alike. As they fit themselves into the traditional molds, they
become pedigreed speakers. The close nexus among pedigree,
elite delivery, and success is underlined by the monetary prize
that goes to the winner of the official, first-year appellate competition. This clearly figures, for students and professors, the
rewards to come.
The traditional, professional repertoire out of which students assemble individual rhetorical practices incarnates the
presuppositions of elite and popular delivery discussed
above.210 While elite rules of physical credibility may, depending on students’ class, social, and ethnic background, be
knowledge they bring with them, legal pedagogy solidifies the
link between those rules and legal rationality. Ancient theorists understood “the soul and the body react on each other. An
altered trait in the soul will produce an altered shape in the
body, while an altered form of the body will produce a corresponding change in the soul.”211 Modern theory agrees: “Bodily
208. A more negative reading, in a vastly more serious context, is that
“[g]esture politics under dictatorial conditions . . . remains a matter of state
manipulation, and of seeking to enforce the conformity of the masses through
the repetition of gestures indicating at least outward commitment to the regime.” Mary Fulbrook, Embodying the Self: Gestures and Dictatorship in
Twentieth Century Germany, in THE POLITICS OF GESTURE: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES 257, 262 (Braddick ed., 2009).
209. For firm-sponsored socializing as an opportunity for first-year students to perform as attorneys and to develop the appropriate habitus, see
Desmond Manderson & Sarah Turner, Law Between the Global and the Local: Coffee House: Habitus and Performance Among Law Students, 31 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 649 (2006).
210. See supra Section II.A.
211. GLEASON, supra note 54, at 29 (citations omitted).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/1

46

2017

EYING THE BODY TO FIND TRUTH

425

hexis [deportment] is political mythology realized, em-bodied,
turned into a permanent disposition, a durable manner of
standing, speaking, and thereby of feeling and thinking.”212
Studies in language acquisition show that:
[G]esture and spoken utterance often have an
equivalence of function. The emergence of the
ability to engage in gesture is seen as an integral
part of the process by which the capacity to use
language comes about . . . . [B]oth gesture and
spoken language develop together and . . . they
both develop in relation to the same combination
of cognitive capacities . . . . [G]esture and spoken
utterance are differentiated manifestations of a
more general process.213
That general process forms a professional self.214

212. PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 93-94 (1977)
(emphasis omitted). Bourdieu’s concept of habitus clarifies what is at stake,
that is, “history turned into nature, i.e. denied as such.” Id. at 78.
213. KENDON, supra note 14, at 76. He is referring primarily to studies
of language acquisition in young children, but there is no reason to believe
that the same process is not at work later. For accounts of this relationship
and studies illustrating it, see id. at 76-83. See generally Susan Wagner Cook
et al., Gesturing Makes Learning Last, COGNITION, Feb. 2008. The authors
suggest that “the body can play a significant role in interpreting meaning”
and “when children are asked to instantiate a new concept in their hands,
learning is more lasting than when they are asked to instantiate it in words
alone.” Id. at 1054. Further, “gesture can play a causal role in knowledge
change.” Id. at 1055.
214. Rideout observes the necessity of “revoicing” law students so they
can use the forms of legal discourse. See Rideout, supra note 49, at 77. This
involves transfer from personal voice to a legal voice that “acquires authority—by virtue of its seeming objectivity and by its reference to underlying layers of textual authority . . . spoken through the repeated agency of ‘the
court’ . . . . [This new voice becomes] that student’s self-representation.” Id.
at 99-100.
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Thus, Mertz’s metaphor that “legal translation . . . embodies an epistemology”215 captures the project to transform bodies
and minds together, recasting both mental and physical patterns. Accounts of students’ pain and disorientation testify to
how deeply it reaches into and reforms the self.216 Bourdieu
comments:
If all societies and, significantly, all the “totalitarian institutions” . . . that seek to produce a
new man through a process of “deculturation”
and “reculturation” set such store on the seemingly most insignificant details of dress, bearing,
physical and verbal manners, the reason is that,
treating the body as a memory, they entrust to it
in abbreviated and practical, i.e. mnemonic, form
the fundamental principles of the arbitrary content of the culture.217
Failure to conform discredits. The intentional or unintentional violation of elite norms can be understood as subversion.218 There is more here than distrust of those outside the
group, or those who violate group norms, or individual preju-

215. Mertz, supra note 195, at 110.
216. Lani Guinier, Michelle Fine, and Jane Balin describe as “painful”
for women “the process of becoming a social male,” which may involve having
“their voices stolen” and alienation “from themselves or who they used to be.”
LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 48 (1997). However, the “strong attitudinal differences between women and men” in the first year undergo “striking homogenization by year three.” Id. at 28. For scholarship identifying negative consequences of “revoicing” students at law school as they acquire a professional
voice, a process similar to acquiring the professional body, see Rideout, supra
note 49, at 81-86.
217. BOURDIEU, supra note 212, at 94 (emphasis omitted).
218. “Hair seems to be such a little thing. Yet it is the littlest things, the
small everyday realities of life, that reveal the deepest meanings and values
of a culture, give legal theory to its grounding and test its legitimacy.” Paulette Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives in the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 366-68 (1991). Similarly, Cicero was disastrously
shortsighted when he did not realize the moment he saw Caesar scratching
his head with one finger that he might overthrow the Roman Republic.
PLUTARCH, CAESAR IV.8 (Loeb Classical Library) (E.H. Warmington ed., Bernadotte Perrin trans., 1919).
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dice—although these, too, may be at work. Nonconformity is
labeled by the entire tradition as lapse of mind.219 By making
the wrong gesture, the advocate slips backward into the nonlegal world of the body, deception, particularity, emotionality,
irrationality, and, finally, insanity.220 This is a particular danger for women and other non-elite groups. Their precarious position requires them to be constantly vigilant in the presentation of a rational, elite self.
B. Suppressing Popular Delivery as Protection of
Justice: Contempt
The elite tradition shapes not only instruction, but practice. Local rules and exercise of contempt power that explicitly
rein in popular strategies enforce the elite paradigm and its
underlying assumptions. Meanwhile, popular speakers regard
their non-elite choices as zealous advocacy. Popular delivery is
necessary to counter implicit elite claims to unique credibility
and to open a gap between elite and non-elite reality and suggest non-elite truths.221 However, non-elite choices in dress,
voice, and gesture are often targeted and repressed by the judicial system as menacing not just courtroom decorum, but the
rationality of trial and the integrity of jurors as rational decision makers.
United States v. Dowdy illustrates this clash between the
219. See supra Sections III.B and C.
220. “[T]he incorporation of the arbitrary abolishes . . . all the eccentricities and deviations which are the small change of madness.” BOURDIEU, supra note 212, at 95.
221. As one attorney, charged with contempt for failing to appear in a
coat and tie, argued, “the requirement of a coat and tie impairs his ability to
represent his clients effectively, because the coat and tie may be viewed by
jurors with suspicion and may place the attorney at a disadvantage in dealing with the jury.” Friedman v. Dist. Ct., 611 P.2d 77, 79 (Alaska 1980). The
Chief Justice agreed with him, mentioning a “pluralistic society” and “reject[ing] any inference that respect for the judicial system is dependent upon
male attorneys wearing neckties. Surely the dignity of the judiciary rests on
more substantial ground.” Id. However, even the dissenting judge operated
within the paradigm that “dress in reasonable attire . . . preserve[s] the dignity of the judiciary and judicial proceedings.” Id. The majority on the Alaskan Supreme Court found that the judge in the district court acted within his
power, despite no evidence of disruption to judicial proceedings, and found
“no merit in his contention that this interferes with [the advocate’s] his duty
to represent his clients zealously.” Id.
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institutional allegiance to elite delivery and an advocate’s
choice of popular delivery.222 In Dowdy, the court held the defense attorney Coe, a woman, in contempt223 under the required standard: “that Coe had the firmly formed intent to obstruct and impede rather than further the search for truth” and
did, in fact, obstruct justice.224
Coe’s first crime was that she employed excessive gesture;
in response to a ruling from the judge, she began what the
court characterized as “the most outlandish performance this
court has ever seen . . . [She] began to prance and
dance[,] . . . grimacing towards the jury and the spectators and
gesturing with her arms and hands.”225 By transgressing the
rules of legal enculturation, Coe becomes foreign, “outlandish.”
She is not within the elite paradigm. Instead, she errs in classic terms. “Grimacing” traditionally recalls the body and indicates lack of self-control, thus undermining the rationality and
truthfulness of speaker.226 Charges of excessive or inappropriate facial gestures are the elite and negative interpretation of
the “animated facial expressions” recommended in trial manuals.227 “Prance and dance” not only reminds us of Cleon, but
her “performance” is dangerously close to the feminine and the
theatrical, both fatal to sincerity and truth. Prancing is characteristic of animals. Dancing betrays passion, often ungovernable and irrational. Quintilian often finds reason to make
sure that speakers will never be close to dancing.228 Of course,
222. See United States v. Dowdy, 764 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. Mo. 1991).
223. She was also publicly reprimanded after disciplinary procedures.
See In re Coe, 903 S.W.2d 916 (Mo. 1995).
224. Dowdy, 764 F. Supp. at 577. The court intervened at least once,
sua sponte, to cut off the attorney’s speech. Id. at 579.
225. Id. at 578.
226. Thus, for example, grimacing is an aspect of “day in the life videos”
that “bring us into deeper intimacy with the suffering body” and is frowned
on by courts. Jody Lyneé Madeira, Lashing Reason to the Mast: Understanding Judicial Constraints on Emotion in Personal Injury Litigation, 40 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 137, 170 (2006).
227. See SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 70, at 266, 300.
228. Dancing, particularly women dancing, has long been a threat to
order and ordinary truth. See, e.g., EURIPIDES, THE BACCHAE (Geoffrey S.
Kirk trans., 1970) (women begin by dancing in the mountains and end by
tearing the king limb from limb); Dwyer v. People, 261 P. 858, 859 (Colo.
1927) (holding that “public dance halls may be regulated under the police
power . . . [because] uncontrolled, their tendency is to weaken morals and
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these actions are emphatically non-elite: the polar opposite of
the proper martial walk and stance.
The threatening presence of the body is confirmed by the
court’s invocation of the offensive “arms and hands,” a detail
which is utterly unnecessary for the sense, which is conveyed
by “gesturing.” Further, Coe is “waving” them; clearly, her
arms are making large motions outside the gestural box. She
is exposing her sides to attack, and her excessive movement
means she is not in control of her body. In terms of the elite
model, the female advocate, independent of what she is saying,
is becoming a woman and a body first and a lawyer second, or
not at all. She has moved out of and below the world of law
and elite delivery. Her weakness, exposed in her waving, menaces truth because it implicates her and her audience in the
corporal imperatives that foster irrationality and lies. The jingling language of the court in “prance and dance” underlines
the extent to which her behavior is disrupting the ordinary flow
of legal language and suggests the repetitive monotony of
speech where words are sounds, not sense.
The court conflates mental and physical imbalance in the
familiar association of inappropriate delivery with the female
and the insane: “Coe argued with the court’s ruling, twice invoked the name of Jesus in arguing her position, in a state of
near hysteria.”229 Jesus, here, reminds us of Quintilian’s observation that improper motion could reveal a speaker to be a
fanatic.230 Hysteria is a female mental disease, a product of the
feminine body, outgrowth of the disordered womb.231 It lies in
wait for all women to disqualify them from the disembodied
world of rational male discourse and the law, instead imprisoning them in the corporal irrationality. Its symptoms are confirmed when we learn that Coe was “out of control in her conduct.”232 Lack of mental control is fatal to rationality. The
entire description naturalizes Coe’s actions as her inevitable
breed disorder and indolence”).
229. Dowdy, 764 F. Supp. at 578-79.
230. See supra Section II.B.
231. “Hysteric” derives from the Greek word for womb, “hustera.”
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH 864 (3d ed. 2010). See supra Section II.B and
notes for the traditional view of the impact of the womb on women’s speech.
232. Dowdy, 764 F. Supp. at 579.
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character, a characterization to which she is particularly susceptible because she begins as one of the potentially vulnerable: a woman.
Yet the court simultaneously interprets Coe’s violation of
the rules of elite decorum as natural evidence of character and
mental state and as strategically chosen, popular rhetoric. Her
conduct is willful and designed to frustrate the search for
truth. Instead it focuses on personal gain, hers and her client’s.233 And, as is only to be expected, Coe’s popular delivery
has a detrimental effect on its audience. Expansive gestures
are evidence of personal corruption that is dangerously contagious. This provides another reason for her suppression: to
“shortstop[] the reaction from the sizable aggregation of spectators obviously friendly to Dowdy.”234 The spectators are a
herd,235 driven along by Coe. The court does not tell us how it
determined that the spectators were personally biased, obviously friendly to Dowdy. It asserts their corruption as fact, explained and reinforced by their also unexplained receptivity to
Coe’s actions. We do not know, and do not need to know, the
evidence of this friendliness; it is assumed as part of the paradigm of popular delivery, which pairs such listeners to a popular speaker. The risk to the audience also underwrites the appellate opinion upholding the lower court’s actions. Coe’s
“actions threatened to shift the focus of the trial away from the
witnesses and the facts and onto herself and her relationship
with the trial judge. Such distractions hamper the administra233. According to the case:
throughout the trial on a daily basis it was clear to the court
that Coe had the firmly formed intent to obstruct and impede rather than further the search for truth and that she
was committed to a course of action that went far beyond
any called for in the performance of an advocate’s effective
representation of his or her client.
Id. at 577.
234. See id. at 578.
235. Aggregation is from the Latin word “grex,” used for a herd, particularly of sheep, then applied to a crowd. Aggregation, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY
OF
THE
ENGLISH
LANGUAGE
(5th
ed.
2016),
https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=aggregation&submit.x=0&sub
mit.y=0.
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tion of justice by diverting a jury’s attention from the real issues before it.”236
Thus, the court recycled traditional and familiar justifications in finding Coe in contempt. Repeated judicial rhetoric
links the courts’ commitment to truth and justice to maintenance of elite decorum by force. Popular delivery is disorder,
by definition.
It is essential to the proper administration of
criminal justice that dignity, order and decorum
be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our
country.” Preservation of the liberties of citizens,
when on trial for crimes charged against them,
demands order in the courtroom. Absent such order, no trial can be fair.237
All this makes it quite clear why Coe must be suppressed.238
Coe’s representation of her client is available primarily
from the opinions of the trial and appellate courts, whose
phrasing condemns Coe’s popular delivery in the usual terms
for its negative impact on rational decision-making. Her actual
argument, her position, is irrelevant, at least in the first holding of contempt. What we can know of the events in the courtroom is heavily filtered through an elite paradigm. However,
the jury verdict suggests an alternative story about Coe, the jury, and the trial. Coe’s delivery can just as easily be understood as strategic, the adoption of popular delivery.239 She was
zealously, and successfully, advocating for her client240 by en-

236. United States v. Dowdy, 960 F.2d 78, 82 (8th Cir. 1992).
237. Dowdy, 764 F. Supp. at 579.
238. In a Catch-22, the defendants’ motions for a new trial were denied
because Coe’s conduct did not make any difference. See United States v.
Turner, 975 F.2d 490, 493 (8th Cir. 1992).
239. For a number of contempt orders against such defense attorneys
due, in part, to the style that they adopt to make their points, see Louis S.
Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt: Constitutional Limitations on the Judicial
Contempt Power, 65 WASH. L. REV. 477, 583-86 (1990).
240. Coe’s defense was “that in each instance she acted zealously, not
contemptuously, because her actions were necessary to explicate her position
and to preserve a record for appellate review.” Dowdy, 960 F.2d at 81. The
court rejected her justification. Id.
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acting a typical popular strategy: put the government on trial.
And she was at least partially successful. The trial lasted thirty-eight days.241 After five days of deliberation, the jury found
her client guilty of only four counts out of the twenty with
which he was charged.242 From the perspective of elite delivery,
this may be further evidence justifying her suppression. Indeed, the trial court found that her conduct constituted a situation “where instant action is necessary to protect the judicial
institution itself.”243 But consideration of the jury verdict suggests another way of conceptualizing Coe’s actions: she functioned as a successful popular advocate adopting non-elite demeanor as the basis for credibility in conveying a non-elite
truth to the jury.244
V. JUSTIFYING LEGAL DECISION-MAKING: THE
PROBLEM OF ACTING, LEAKAGE, AND UNIVERSAL
BODY LANGUAGE
The elite rhetorical tradition successfully combined a foundational claim—the body is a touchstone of credibility—with a
potent political assertion: the bodily signals of rationality and
truth track the habits of elite warrior speakers. Conversely,
the same paradigm condemns non-elite speakers appealing to
the democratic masses as deceptive and irrational—claims
proven by their rejection of elite rules and adoption of other
demeanor. The next step was equally important: the notion of
a universal human body language that includes inevitable
“leakage”245 of involuntary nonverbal clues of deception. These
twin assumptions had two enormous benefits: First, they contain the risk of the persuasive skills promised by professional
instruction, including in demeanor, through a universal human
241. Dowdy, 764 F. Supp. at 577.
242. One count was dismissed by the court, as well. Id.
243. Id. at 579 (quoting Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 167
(1965)).
244. The record supports this was her approach in recording her repeated questions of government witnesses, probably to insinuate they are lying.
Dowdy, 960 F.2d at 79-80.
245. The term is associated with Paul Ekman. See Ekman & Friesen,
supra note 38, at 88. It is now a common way to identify bodily basis of lie
detection. See, e.g., Hutchins, supra note 32, at 535-36.
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ability to read the equally universal signs of the body. Second,
they justify imperial, elite judgment of the credibility of outsiders, including women, poor citizens, and foreigners, as based on
nature, assuaging any anxiety about personal or systemic ignorance.
Delivery, or non-verbal communication’s rules, derives
from a common understanding: “listener-viewers stare at you,
scrutinizing each small movement. Small components of
movement, sound, and words—your individual persuasive
techniques—quickly add up to a general perception and ultimately to a trial outcome.”246 (Note the damaging connection of
persuasion and trial in this passage.) Although tradition splits
on exactly what proper habits may be – popular or elite – both
sides agree the credible body requires the conscious suppression of certain gestures and the acquisition of new bodily habits
that will be the repertoire of truthfulness, that is, paradoxically
strategies.247
The emphasis on delivery as strategy has several advantages. Most obvious is the role of expertise in creating and
sustaining a market for professional speakers and, of course,
instructors while acting as a barrier to those identified as unskilled. Thus, it preserves social and intellectual capital.
However, the notion of strategy also plays a role inside the rhetorical struggle between elite and popular delivery. It mitigates the threat of the undeniably effective techniques of popular delivery, at least to speakers of impeccable elite credentials.
History records the migration of various techniques of delivery
from the popular to the elite repertoire.248 As strategies, such
techniques become mental product, not bodily expression. Elite
speakers249 can then exploit popular trademarks like emotion,
246. 84 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, supra note 93, § 1. The well-trained speaker
“use[s] certain tones according as he wishes to seem himself to be moved and
to sway the minds of his audience.” CICERO, ORATOR, supra note 20, at xvii
55.
247. See supra Section IV.A.
248. Even the trademark ancient gesture of slapping the thigh became
acceptable when attempting to arouse emotion, particularly at trial, see
CICERO, BRUTUS, supra note 20, at lxxx.278, likewise, stamping the foot. See
also QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.123.
249. See supra Section III for the condemnation of lower-class speakers
who fail to conform to the requirements of elite speech. They are not granted
the license of elite speakers. “[L]ow status violators [of communicative
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gestures, and loud voice without positioning themselves on the
wrong side of the mind/body divide. But, as noted above, the
same is not true of non-elite speakers or their audience. Both
remain subject to the link between popular delivery and irrationality.250
Once non-verbal communication becomes a product of skill,
the next step has been obvious: the stage is an excellent resource251 for, “[a]s all actors know, only the practiced hand . . .
can make the natural gesture.”252 While advice to look to acting for help with speaking has been given for over two thousand years, theatricality raises the specter of lies and severs
the connection between the character of the speaker and the
manner of speaking.253 For this reason, the distinction between
acting and arguing is carefully maintained. Those who advise
instruction from actors often find themselves in the paradoxical
position of asserting that, really, truth and the advocate’s own
nature are the best persuasion. This is summed up in the fanorms] are perceived negatively, while high status ones are not. . . . The same
nonverbal act may hold different meanings in varying contexts depending
upon one’s status in the proceedings.” Searcy et al., supra note 107, at 43.
250. Quintilian ends instruction on delivery with the point that contemporary delivery is more excited, but requires care not to lose in the elegance of an actor the authority of a good man (“bonus,” a word for the elite).
QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.184.
251. Aristotle links the impact of delivery to actors, something he deplores. ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, §1403b,1404a. Acting is a frequent comparison for Quintilian, who begins his entire discussion of delivery with a
consideration of the power of actors. QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at IX.iii.4.
Demosthenes took instruction from actors; Cicero recommends it. Id. at
XI.iii.7. For additional discussion and passages, see BALL, supra note 76, and
infra for the similar modern views.
252. Otto G. Obermaier, Judge Conducted Voir Dire, 340 PRACTICING L.
INST. LITIG. 151 (1987). See also 28 AM. JUR. TRIALS 599 Principles of Summation § 1 (2016); Matheo & DeCaro, supra note 46, at 30-31; ARON ET AL.,
supra note 90, at ch. 14 §§ 2.05-.06. Sayler and Shadel begin their discussion
of delivery by acknowledging the necessity of sounding “natural” while engaging in an unnatural act, public speaking. SAYLER & SHADEL, supra note 16, at
56-61. They invoke the theater while innovating, from the tradition’s perspective, with the figure of an actress. Id. This illustrates the flexibility of
the tradition in accommodating new speakers while maintaining its underlying conceptual framework. Id.
253. Gunderson discusses many passages maintaining the distinction:
“The orator is associated with truth and the spirit; the actor with fiction and
the body.” Gunderson, supra note 54, at 112. For the distinction between
Roman actors and orators, even while speakers were encouraged to learn
from actors, see Graf, supra note 54, passim.
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mous dictum: “As a man lives so will he speak.”254 Yet this remark performs an ideological function only. It is not allowed to
interfere with detailed instruction, insisting that being “himself” requires rigid adherence to precise, and remarkably consistent, instructions about style and delivery.
The point, of course, is to sustain the role of skill in looking
credible in the eyes of others, yet maintain a link to inner
truth. The tension is obvious. Quintilian requires that the
speaker find even simulated emotion within himself: “the main
thing is to excite the appropriate feeling in oneself, to form a
mental picture of the facts, and to exhibit an emotion that cannot be distinguished from the truth.”255 The same method is
embraced today as solving ethical and practical problems.
“Our practical suggestion to lawyers in court is: be natural, be
yourself. Analyze what your personality and human characteristics can do, and extract from this your own potential and develop with practice and work your own inner qualities.”256 Although the nature called into the arena of speech is identified
with “your personality and human characteristics,” the subordination of the “self” to the needs of physical credibility is hard
to overlook.
The struggle to root the rhetorical self in some underlying
extra-rhetorical reality that nevertheless supports the persuasive endeavor points at the paradox in truth-seeking carried
out via adversarial speakers, particularly when skill enters the
equation. The potency of strategic non-verbal communication
undermines the decision-making process; it raises the risk of
254. QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.i.30.
255. Id. at IX.iii.62. An authority who defends the necessity of acting
(and quotes Quintilian) argues:
[T]he actor remains himself or herself, drawing on his or her
personal store of emotional memory to provide authenticity
in his or her reaction to the script, rather than ‘faking it’ by
some series of conventional, but contrived, external gestures. . . . [T]here is an authentic approach to acting in the
courtroom, just as there is on stage. . . . [T]he lawyer does
not adopt a courtroom demeanor, and, like Sir John Gielgud, plays only himself or herself.
Peter W. Murphy, “There’s No Business Like. . .?” Some Thoughts on the Ethics of Acting in the Courtroom, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 116-17 (2002).
256. ARON ET AL., supra note 90, § 14.21.
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deceit. If an expert speaker can deploy a highly disciplined and
credible self, what will ensure that such a speaker is, in fact,
truthful, rather than credible? How can decision making be
saved from skill designed to manipulate it?
One way to reduce the risk of deceit is speakers’ personal
virtue—thus, the insistent claim, already referenced above,
that to be a good speaker one must be a good man. This claim
consolidates advantage and social and cultural capital by making instruction something sinister. Yet it has been a commonplace of teachers of non-verbal communication since antiquity.257 Minimally, it deflects censure and promotes the utility of
an instrumental virtue: be what you wish to seem in order to
seem it successfully. But most instruction and discussion is
more ambitious. As discussed above, rigorous training in the
proper demeanor is considered not only to produce an accomplished speaker, but to educate character. Training in the correct physical signifiers of credibility ultimately corrects the
person, or the soul. This assimilates conventional requirements of delivery and personal morality, or, put in another
way, learning the rules and becoming the rules.
What we now call leakage, that is, bodily signs of deceit or
emotion, is another strategy to protect the institutional project
of truth seeking. Ancient and modern theory posit an unavoidable link between internal and external, conceptualized variously as soul, character, mind, and so forth:258
In order to be able to persuade, the trial attorney
must be personally convinced that he or she is
fulfilling a mission, the role of the advocate in
achieving justice. It is the advocate’s duty to perform this mission with conscience because advo257. A competing view reverses the equation: delivery that owes nothing to art and is simply an expression of the soul is best. As is to be expected
in a teacher of rhetoric, including delivery, QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at
XI.iii.10, dismisses it while paying allegiance to the elite claim that proper
demeanor is an aspect of character: an orator, to be good, must be a good
man. Id. at I.Pr.9. See JAMES W. JEANS, TRIAL ADVOCACY 7 (2d ed. 1993); 72
AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, §§ 5, 9.
258. Quintilian, for example, begins his instruction on gesture by linking the quality of the voice, gesture, glance and gait to the mind in the context of introducing instruction. QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at IX.iii.62, 65, 66.
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cacy without conscience is like a body without a
soul.259
This link underlies the standard claim that it “has long
been recognized that our bodies can reveal our true thoughts
and emotions, even when we try to hide them from others.”260
These inevitable leaks check the impulse to lie because they
provide a body language of deception. The tradition’s efforts
are expressed in a core image: the hand is index to the mind.
The phrase is Cicero’s,261 but the premise resonates today, often asserted through Freud’s famous statement: “He that has
eyes to see and ears to hear may convince himself that no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with his
finger-tips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore.”262 Yes this
is the same hand, discussed above, that learns to make “natural” gestures. The contradictory uses of this image underscore
the tensions between rhetorical skill and decision-making, particularly based on a unitary ideal of truth.
Adoption of the body as the reliable gauge of truthfulness
tracks the conception of the body as autonomous and ungovernable that underwrites the rejection of popular delivery.
Skill fails before incarnated fear, desire, and passion. “Juries
recognize lawyers who have questionable ethics in the courtroom often because they inadvertently spill subtle and sometimes blatant cues, which trigger reactions in the jurors and
clue the jurors into the lawyers’ true natures.”263 Yet the clues
to deceit remain as much creatures of rhetorical theory as the
gestures of truthfulness. Although long debunked by research,
the tells remain those prohibited by elite rules: blinking, fid-

259. ARON ET AL., supra note 90, at 1-26.
260. JURYWORK, supra note 114, § 15.10. Another treatise asks: “The
question becomes, can an unethical advocate completely cover up his or her
nature to the point that jurors are dupes? . . . probably not.” 72 AM. JUR.
TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 11.
261. See Graf, supra note 54, at 40.
262. Quoted, for example, in Timony, supra note 32, at 903 n.2. See also
JURYWORK, supra note 114, § 15:10 (continuing with advice that although this
may not be true, people believe that it is and act accordingly at trials and
elsewhere).
263. 72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 7.
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dling, repetitive gestures, indirect gaze, etc.264 “[I]t is much
harder for them [speakers] to lie with their bodies. . . . [T]here
are always little gestures that give away the truth. It may be
the classic “nose wipe” or undue eye blinking or improper eye
contact.”265 Thus, a gesture like scratching the nose, expressive
from the very beginning of the class struggle echoed in the
philosophical and rhetorical controversies over democracy, remains, counter to all evidence, the sign of the liar.266
Effective functioning of the elite paradigm, however, requires a further step, foundational to the court systems: that
“natural” signs267 are part of a universal, bodily language constant across individuals and cultures.268 Cicero sets the stage:
“Every motion of the soul has its natural appearance, voice and
gesture; and the entire body of a man, all his facial and vocal
expressions, like the strings of a harp, sound just as the soul’s
motion strikes them.”269 This is much more than a statement
that speech is created by physical motions in human bodies.
Cicero begins, here, by asserting the inevitable linkage of inner
264. Similarly, police manuals list non-verbal signs of deception and an
entire method, the Behavioral Analysis Interview, depend on particular behavioral responses from which the interrogator can ascertain the suspect’s
guilt or innocence. The interrogator is to “focus primarily on the suspect’s
behavioral responses rather than the actual content of his answers.” Richard
A. Leo, The Third Degree, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS AND ENTRAPMENT
65 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004). They include “shifting posture. . . stroking
the back of one’s head or hair, . . . shuffling or tapping one’s feet, . . . placing
one’s hand over the mouth or eyes, crossing one’s arms or legs” and so forth.
Id. Innocence is predicated on perception of truthfulness; guilt on deception.
Id. at 66. Leo concludes that these methods rest on “little more than the subjective hunches and personal judgments of the investigator. There is, no
short, no reason to believe that their diagnostic value is any better than
chance.” Id. at 79. The advice and individual hunches are products of the
classical rhetorical tradition: the behaviors characteristic of deception match
markers of the vulnerable speaker. See Minzner, supra note 3, at 2560.
265. ARON ET AL., supra note 90, § 5:3. For shifty eyes as indicators of
deception, see, e.g., Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
855 F.2d 963, 974 (2d Cir. 1988).
266. See Appendix A.
267. The discussion of gesture claims a common language of hands, in
spite of differences in language. QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.87.
268. Recent work on recognition of emotions across cultures both validates and sets tight limits on the universal natural bodily language comprehensible by all despite cultural differences. See Matsumoto & Hwang, supra
note 36, at 227-29.
269. DE OR, supra note 20, at III.216; Graf, supra note 54, at 41.
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and outer; he ends gestures and voice to the sounds produced
by a skilled musician.270 The same conceptual complex emerges in the opening section of a well-known book on trial communication by a judge, an expert in non-verbal communication,
and an attorney:
Body language is expressed in a variety of ways.
Everybody is familiar with gestures: the hand to
the cheek that says, “Oh God!” or the scratching
of the hair behind the ear that signals, “Let me
think.” Rodin’s famous sculpture, The Thinker,
used the chin supported by a closed fist to convey
a universal signal of thoughtfulness. That simple
gesture speaks more to a viewer than all the descriptive words written about the statue.271
Thus, products of particular, elite, artistic traditions represent
a universalized physical language everybody knows.272
A postulated universal natural language of the body remedies problems of ignorance and skill, bedeviling decision in our
rhetorical-legal tradition:
[A]ll the factors of delivery contain a certain force
bestowed by nature; which moreover is the reason [that] it is delivery that has most effect on
the ignorant and the mob and lastly on barbarians; for words influence nobody but the person
270. DE OR, supra note 20, at III.213-217.
271. ARON ET AL., supra note 90, § 2.02. The same authors, two sections
later, acknowledge that body language is largely cultural. Id. § 2.04.
272. As Bob Gibbins and A. Russell Smith comment:
[a]lmost everyone will recognize certain universal body language messages. For example, one universal sign of defensiveness is the arms crossed on the chest. Another signal
which can be revealing is the nose-rub or nose-touching. . .
While it is beyond the scope of this book to define or catalog
every nonverbal signal of significance, the advocate will be
aware of many of them without any formal training or even
casual study. It is important to bring this knowledge into
play during trial.
AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 74:8 (Hodson ed., 3d ed. 2001).
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allied to the speaker by sharing the same language, and clever ideas frequently outfly the understanding of people who are not clever, whereas delivery, which gives the emotion of the mind
expression, influences everybody, for the same
emotions are felt by all people and they both recognize them in others and manifest them in
themselves by the same marks.273
Demeanor flourishes, in our tradition, in the context of deficiency. It works most magically when the listener cannot
check,274 or perhaps even comprehend, what is said.275 This potentially explosive situation is remedied by a postulated common humanity; everyone, even a barbarian, can at least read
the body.276 Yet the “consensus that relegated credibility to the
273. DE OR, supra note 20, at III.lix.223.
274. Popular delivery rejects the idea that there are people, events, or
venues of decision in which persuasion is not key. However, the elite tradition assigns persuasion, and with it delivery as a popular tactic, to the ignorant. See PLATO, GORGIAS 462d-466a, supra note 127 (rhetoric compared to
cookery for the ignorant); ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, § 1403b-1404a. Thus, in
trial “it is imperative that trial lawyers learn to mask to some extent. They
are paid to mask their true feelings, for the most part, and give the best protection they can for their clients.” 84 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, supra note 93, § 23.
“Jurors in their quest to determine justice look anxiously at trial lawyers and
their clients to determine ‘truth.’ They study them intently.” Id. § 4.
Jurors search the lawyer’s face and expressions, seeking
sincerity and commitment. . . for signs of character and
truth in facial configuration and expression. An inner character may be seen in the form or the shape of the features,
the manner of arrangement, and the position of the parts,
that radiates strength and power.
72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 46.
275. “When jurors tune out substantive testimony, serious consequences
follow. Adler observed, ‘Rocky and the others often found themselves focusing
on more concrete matters. Foster wore his suits too tight; another lawyer
picked his nose.’ He is right– the irrelevant becomes relevant, and often
amusing.” Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk From Complexity, the
New Media, and Deviancy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 54 (1995).
276. Cicero observes that delivery (composed of voice and action) is like
speech or a sort of eloquence of the body. Quoted by QUINTILIAN, supra note
20, at IX.iii.1. The metaphor is common: “[L]awyers should realize that their
own gestures in court either will help or hurt their cases because gestures
change their spoken words, and, when not speaking, gesturing, posture, and
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realm of common knowledge”277 is a product of a rhetorical tradition of imperial, multi-ethnic, slavery-based societies in
which law was the pastime of the ruling elite. In this context,
postulating a common body and universal, natural bodily language is risky, but necessary. It frees members of the legal regime from worry about ignorance and any obligation to recognize difference—because, naturally, this difference simply does
not exist. This stripping to a postulated natural body is a required first step in the creation of the abstract legal participant. As Peter Goodrich points out in the context of clothes,
“before the law there are only individuals, subjects that can be
reconstructed as legal actors, abstract subjects, individuals
without clothes, certainly without all that clothes implies,
namely the social and ceremonial dimensions of collective and
ethnic life, the material and social habitus of the individual.”278
The postulated natural language of the body also rescues the
practice of legal skill from a potential charge of deception, for
all can understand its message. Thus, it underwrites the adversarial system and “wide latitude [for] trial lawyers to determine how best to expose the strengths and weaknesses of
witnesses. . . . It is assumed that the nature of the adversarial
process provides the necessary inducement and that juries are
fully capable of evaluating the information provided,”279 as is
that product of elite legal rhetorical education, the judge.
Thus, the assumptions of our rhetorical tradition sustain
performance and judgment. A modern handbook captures the
dynamic when, after extolling skillful demeanor and instruction in acting, it pivots to remind the reader:
There are lawyers who think that to enhance
their role as prosecutors or defenders, they must
be good actors, but that is not necessarily true.
Before persuading a jury or a judge, counsel
movement cues are ‘read’ as an unspoken language of their own.” 84 AM.
JUR. TRIALS 1, supra note 93, § 2. See generally G. NIERENBERG & H. CALERO,
HOW TO READ A PERSON LIKE A BOOK (1971).
277. Blinka, supra note 8, at 367. See also Jane H. Aiken, Teaching the
Rules of “Truth”, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1075, 1083 (2006).
278. PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF THE LAW 181 (1990).
279. Blinka, supra note 8, at 368.
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must be personally persuaded that his or her position is the right one. . . . If a lawyer takes a position that he or she does not believe, something
in the advocate’s voice or body language will betray the words, no matter how eloquently the argument is phrased. There is an invisible link between what the lawyer thinks and feels and what
he or she is saying; judges and jurors have a special ability to detect these feelings. A lawyer is
not an actor and must not be seduced by the false
idea that acting will be an effective tool for persuasion.280
This fascinating passage labors to reconcile paradoxes inherent in the tradition of delivery even as it exploits them to
justify ancient foundations of our legal system: orality as a
predicate for decision making, the propriety of credibility assessments by the audience, the dominance of an elite view of
unitary and universal truth, and, critically, the claims to skill
and virtue of the legal profession. The strategically flexible
characterization of listeners—at once open to manipulation and
endowed with an unvarying nose for deceit—combine with the
rules of demeanor and the ancient ideology of leakage and universal body language to maintain fundamental institutional
and professional claims, explaining how rhetorical jousting by
highly skilled speakers seeking to attain personal ends will
lead to truth.281

280. ARON ET AL., supra note 90, §14.21 (acting is recommended in
§ 2.05).
281. This is closely related to the role of the jury as a black box in maintaining institutional legitimacy. See Fisher, supra note 9, at 587-602.
“[A]lthough the jury does not guarantee accurate lie detecting, it does detect
lies in a way that appears accurate . . . By making the jury its lie detector,
the system protects its own legitimacy.” Id. at 578-79.
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VI. CONCLUSION: The Promise of Uniformity and
Necessity of Blind Justice
Professional allegiance to the paradigm of elite demeanor
has social benefits. Enculturation into the paradigm dresses
law students and attorneys in a professional uniform. Like the
ubiquitous dark suits adopted by 1Ls, it smoothes preprofessional differences.282 Elite demeanor is a badge of professional identity that signals inclusion in the professional world
from which, at least, historically, other parts of students’ and
attorneys’ identities might exclude them. For this reason
alone, it should be taught to all students rather than being the
exclusive possession of those who inherit the knowledge as a
form of social capital.283 Further, instruction in delivery is part
of a professionalization project that links students, in this case
physically, to a lineage of virtuous professional elders who provide exempla for future excellence, a project enhanced by the
moral meaning read into this physical exercise.284 Like other
282. As Charles M. Yablon comments:
[a]nyone who has ever observed an American law school
during interview season, with everyone wearing the same
blue pin stripe suit, carrying the same resume, and mouthing the same platitudes. (‘Yes, I’m sure that working on collateralized receivable financing deals will be very exciting’)
knows that it does not take wigs to remove differences of
gender, race, and age. All it takes is a first rate legal education.
Charles M. Yablon, Judicial Drag: an Essay on Wigs, Robes and Legal
Change, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1129, 1142 (1995). For the cost of this uniform in
abstracting legal subjects and their representatives paralleling the choice of
discourse and of language itself, see GOODRICH, note 278, at 180-81.
283. This double-edged aspect of instruction in delivery—liberating, yet
imprisoning—associates it with the processes of abstraction and opportunity
inherent in the common law itself and its “linguistic ideology” as discussed by
MERTZ, supra note 195, at 212-20.
284. This physical chain of past and present attorneys enhances identification with the profession and its goals tied to a future inhabited by reincarnations of the same ideal. Similarly, originalism and fidelity to the Constitution as “our law” promote “an identification between ourselves, those
who lived in the past and those who will live in the future . . . that connect[s]
past generations to present ones through a process of narrative identifica-
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invocations of precedential authority, backward looking bodily
quoting is the sine qua non of meaningful participation in our
legal regime, independent of content. Its effect has much in
common with similar benefits detected in originalism and other
types of constitutional argument.285 In this analysis, “ethical
originalism” establishes a unity of field for the groups “Americans” and attorneys.286 This unity produced through a common
form exists despite the content and purpose of individual arguments. That this is a fictive unity,287 a product of “cultural
memory,” not historical accuracy,288 in no way diminishes its
importance to its participants and the civic project of rooting
both participants and all citizens in continuously redefined, yet
American, experience.289
Enhanced instruction about demeanor can preserve its professional benefits—and extend them to students who may otherwise lack them and to their future clients—while mitigating
the individual cost of assimilation to such norms. The variants
of delivery and their conceptual framework should be taught as
historically determined, arbitrary markers whose acquisition is
a matter of joining a professional discourse community. Strategic choices in delivery can be understood as skillful professionalism, not personal proficiency or deficiency in morality,
tion . . . as part of a larger political project that stretches back to the present
and forward to the future.” Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 465 (2007).
285. “Arguments from ethos and tradition often call for us to remember
what ‘‘we’—here a transgenerational subject—fought for, what we stand for,
what we promised we would do, and what we promised we would never let
happen again.” Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 684 (2013). For a similar effect of classical rhetorical education, see HABINEK, supra note 14, at 72-76.
286. “The core framers are heroes and celebrities, and the project of
identifying original meanings asks us to stand in their shoes. It is no wonder
that so many people like doing it.” Richard Primus, The Functions of Ethical
Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 79, 84 (2010). Physical imagery conveys conceptual adherence.
287. Balkin, supra note 285, at 684-85.
288. Id. at 694-97.
289. “Enabling citizens and officials to identify with the major figures of
their national political traditions serves important civic functions. It encourages them to relate to the governing regime as their own, rather than as
something alien or imposed. That attitude toward government is an important element of legitimacy.” Primus, supra note 286, at 84.
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rationality, or credibility.290 Explicit instruction about the fallibility of traditional markers of credibility may help future attorneys and judges work properly with a wider variety of individuals. Understanding the historical, ideological basis for the
assignment of rationality to elite, and irrationality to popular,
demeanor may trickle up to promote reassessment of the rules
governing trial and practices of decision making.
Yet changed instruction will only indirectly reduce the
much steeper costs of the current paradigm paid by other participants in the legal regime, by society, and by the judicial system itself for the errors introduced by traditional, institutional
reliance on physical credibility.291 People from diverse social,
ethnic, racial, religious, physical, or cultural backgrounds, including minorities,292 immigrants, and asylum seekers,293 indi290. For this approach to instruction in fundamental skills in written
content, for example, grammar, punctuation, and style, often also associated
with moral and personal values, see Jeremy Francis, Daphne O’Regan &
Ryan Black, Designing Success: Motivating and Measuring Successful 1L
Student Engagement in an Optional, Proficiency-Based Program Teaching
Grammar and Punctuation, 21 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. (2016),
http://www.legalwritingjournal.org/2016/09/15/designing-success-motivatingand-measuring-successful-1l-student-engagement-in-an-optional-proficiencybased-program-teaching-grammar-and-punctuation/. Primus’ analysis of
originalism traces its power to “whether their audiences recognize themselves, or perhaps their idealized selves, in the portrait of American origins
that is on offer.” Primus, supra note 286, at 80. A similar value of such constitutional argument is “subjective identification with the regime.” Richard
A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165,
203 (2008).
291. For example, in asylum cases, the “credibility determination presents obstacles that favor the fraudulent applicant over the genuine asylum
seeker.” Rose Linton, Note, A Presumption of Disclosure: Towards Greater
Transparency in Asylum Proceedings, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1069, 1083
(2015). A well-rehearsed, false story can avoid “factors that can make a genuine applicant appear evasive during her direct testimony—cultural norms,
PTSD, and negative experiences with officials.” Id. at 1087. The same idea
underlies the well-known practice to rehearse witnesses. Similarly, originalism may degrade decision-making, and identification with an idealized past
undermines change. See Richard A. Primus, Judicial Power and Mobilizable
History, 65 MD. L. REV. 171, 179-80 (2006).
292. Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the
Jury, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2000); Pager, supra note 31, at 397. See Amanda
Carlin, Comment, The Courtroom as White Space: Racial Performance as
Noncredibility, 63 UCLA L. REV. 450, 468 (2016).
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viduals with disabilities,294 traumatized victims,295 medicated
defendants,296 persons with religious objections to baring their
face in public,297 and many others are at risk in a variety of
ways; they share a tragic susceptibility to misreading of their
credibility, particularly since an individual may have multiple
risk factors. Ongoing controversies and numerous studies suggest awareness of the problem, which intersects with the problem of implicit bias—although here mistaken beliefs can be ex-

293. Katherine E. Melloy, Note, Telling Truths: How the Real ID Act’s
Credibility Provisions Affect Women Asylum Seekers, 92 IOWA L. REV. 637,
658 (2007). The author points out the numerous ways in which such women
are at risk. Id. at 653-61. Male asylum seekers face similar risks, particularly if they are members of sexual minorities. Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the Real ID Act is a False Promise, 43 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 101, 129-33 (2006). See also Melanie A. Conroy, Real Bias: How
Real ID’s Credibility and Corroboration Requirements Impair Sexual Minority Asylum Applicants, 24 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 1, 34 (2009); James
P. Eyster, Searching for the Key in the Wrong Place: Why “Common Sense”
Credibility Rules Consistently Harm Refugees, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1 (2012); Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 367 (2003).
294. Christine N. Cea, Note, Autism and the Criminal Defendant, 88 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 495, 519 (2014).
295. For battered women, rape victims (rape trauma syndrome and demeanor), and abused children (child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome),
see annotations in 85 A.L.R.5th 595 (2005). See e.g., State v. Dudley, 856
N.W.2d 668 (Iowa 2014). Even people judged “unattractive” are at risk.
AMINA MEMON ET AL. PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: TRUTHFULNESS, ACCURACY AND
CREDIBILITY 39-42 (2d ed. 2003).
296. See Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the
Courtroom, 92 MINN. L. REV. 573 (2008).
297. The Michigan Rules of Evidence, apparently amended to allow
judges to order women to remove their veils in court, require judges to “exercise reasonable control over the appearance of parties and witnesses so as to
(1) ensure that the demeanor of such persons may be observed and assessed
by the fact-finder.” MICH. R. EVID. 611(b). See Brian M. Murray, Confronting
Religion: Veiled Muslim Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1727, 1728 (2010); Steven R. Houchin, Confronting the Shadow:
Is Forcing A Muslim Witness to Unveil in A Criminal Trial A Constitutional
Right, or an Unreasonable Intrusion?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 823 (2009); Aaron J.
Williams, The Veiled Truth: Can the Credibility of Testimony Given by A
Niqab-Wearing Witness Be Judged Without the Assistance of Facial Expressions?, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 273, 273-74 (2008).
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plicitly invoked. Solutions including demeanor experts298 and
judicial instructions have been proposed or attempted.299 Yet
they are unlikely to work. Use of demeanor experts risks only
relocating decision making on the basis of delivery to a battle of
experts. Jury instructions or education before the trial are unlikely to be successful300 and may even exacerbate the problem.301 Positioning the solution in the hands of judges ignores

298. Anne Bowen Poulin, Credibility: A Fair Subject for Expert Testimony?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 991, 1004-05 (2007); Michael W. Mullane, The Truthsayer and the Court: Expert Testimony on Credibility, 43 ME. L. REV. 53, 64
(1991).
299. Levenson, supra note 296, at 573 (proposing jury instructions);
Bennett, supra note 2, at 1371.
300. “Studies have shown jury instructions to be broadly ineffective
across a wide variety of contexts.” Pager, supra note 31, at 425. This is generally true of attempts to remove cognitive bias and biasing information.
MacLean & Dror, supra note 4, at 19-21. Data suggest that a reason “jury
instructions seem to be poorly understood . . . [is] ‘common sense justice.’”
James R. P Ofloff & V. Gordon Rose, The Comprehension of Judicial Instructions in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 407, 246 (Neil Brewer & Kipling D. Williams
eds., 2005). Common sense justice certainly includes demeanor and implicit,
or explicit, bias.
301. As Amy L. Wax comments:
[i]t is also virtually impossible to identify and correct bias
from the ‘inside’’ that is, through introspective processes.
Decision makers are generally unaware of the magnitude
and direction of their own automatic biases. Even if they
could willfully activate mechanisms to control and correct
for presumed biases, they would have difficulty calibrating
the corrective measures because they cannot gauge the precise extent to which particular biases are distorting their
mental processes.
Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1160 (1999) (citations omitted). Diversity training aimed at unconscious biases in the workplace has not been shown to work. See Alexandra Kalevet al., Best Practices
or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and
Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 589-617 (2006). See also David Millier,
Can Bias Training Really Improve Diversity in Tech?, U.S. NEWS (July 29,
2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/29/can-bias-trainingreally-improve-diversity-in-tech. Nevertheless, the jury is still out on positive
impacts of training on implicit bias. See Bennett, supra note 2, at 169-70.
Judge Bennett advocates as well for the elimination of peremptory challenges
to avoid the impact of implicit or cognitive bias. Id. at 168.
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their participation in the traditional paradigm.302
Screening or blinding decision makers so they cannot see
any participants, including attorneys, while allowing them to
hear and to see other evidence, is a potentially more effective
solution. This extends suggestions made by Blumenthal, who
proposes screening the defendant “from the witness . . . and the
witness from the jury, who can then focus on her voice in assessing credibility.”303 Pager has also proposed screening witnesses, possibly including the defendant, from the jury.304 As
Pager points out, screening has the advantage of retaining
much of what is perhaps most reliable – voice and presentation
of content.305 No right inheres in the jury or judge that requires visual presence. Indeed, blind jurors are allowed on the
grounds that excluding them would be discriminatory given
their other ways to assess testimony.306 Further, legal rules,
including evidentiary rules, already deny jurors other types of
information that might be “unduly biasing.”307 Screening
302. For judges’ susceptibility to emotion, including reactions to participants in trials, see Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Heart Versus Head: Do Judges
Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 871-72 (2015).
303. Blumenthal, supra note 32, at 1202.
304. Pager, supra note 31, at 429-33. Similarly, Spottswood proposes
that live testimony be preferred at the beginning of litigation, followed by a
switch to paper-based trials as more accurate. Spottswood, supra note 32, at
879, 881. See Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentences: Reconsidering Deference, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2123, 1248-49 (2010) (advocating that
appellate review is the “functional equivalent of Dr. Pager’s screen” and,
thus, more reliable).
305. Content is a much better indication of truth than physical demeanor. Pager, supra note 31, at 386.
306. “[B]lind individuals, like sighted jurors, weigh the content of the
testimony given and examine speech patterns, intonation, and syntax in assessing credibility.” Galloway v. Superior Court of D.C., 816 F. Supp. 12, 16
(D.D.C. 1993). See generally Nancy Lawler Dickhute, Jury Duty for the Blind
in the Time of Reasonable Accommodations: The ADA’s Interface with A Litigant’s Right to A Fair Trial, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 849 (1999). See also Adam
Schwartzbaum, The Niqab in the Courtroom: Protecting Free Exercise of Religion in A Post-Smith World, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1533, 1568 (2011). He
grounds his argument on the inaccuracy of cultural markers of deception. Id.
at 1571.
307. Shari Seidman Diamond, The Cases for and Against Blindfolding
the Jury, in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS, supra note 4, at 267. Diamond
notes that evidentiary and other content restricting “rules forbidding juries
access to available information have often been imposed to improve jury deci-
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builds on this standard approach. It is beyond the scope of this
article to assess the mechanics of screening in civil trials and
the interaction of screening and the Confrontation Clause in
criminal trials.308 However, it is worth noting that screening
the decision maker still allows for witness-defendant confrontation and cross-examination.309
Screening decision makers also leaves intact the role of jury or judge in credibility determinations, simply removing “information” that has no value and may mislead. The importance and efficacy of blind judgment in an arena in which
the content of information is aural has been much discussed in
the contexts of blind orchestra auditions.310 Of course, as with
auditions, blinding cannot remove all misleading markers of
credibility that also could drive bias; gender, names, and other
markers would remain.311 Because many moments before court
sion making[,]. . . [but]are based on untested assumptions about how jurors
make decisions.” Id. at 275.
308. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
309. Blumenthal and Pager point out that screening can harmonize
with the Confrontation Clause by allowing for cross examination and confrontation between defendant and accusers. Blumenthal, supra note 32, at 1175;
Pager, supra note 31, at 415-19.
310. For similar ideas in employment contexts, including argument
from blind orchestral auditions, usually following Claudia Goldin & Cecilia
Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians, 90(4) AM. ECON. REV. 715-41 (2000), see Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative
Action”, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063 (2006). See also Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy
Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity, 85 MINN. L. REV.
587, 611 (2000); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is ColorBlind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5 n.20 (1991); Facial Discrimination: Extending
Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2052 (1987). For blinding in the documents about federal death penalty authorization, see G. Ben Cohen & Robert
J. Smith, The Racial Geography of the Federal Death Penalty, 85 WASH. L.
REV. 425, 488-89 (2010).
311. For names promoting bias, see generally, Marianne Bertrand &
Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha
and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM.
ECON. REV. 991 (2004); Rhea E. Steinpreis et al., The Impact of Gender on the
Review of the Curricula Vitae of Job Applicants and Tenure Candidates: A
National Empirical Study, 41 SEX ROLES 509 (1999). However, “race is not
predicated on sight alone; the construction of race’s import crosses many sensory and political modalities.” Judith Resnik & Dennis Curtis, Why Eyes?
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processes also rely on demeanor credibility determinations, the
remedy is perhaps too limited. Blinding might even lead to a
misguided sense of optimism about the act of decision and the
possibilities of impartiality.312 Nevertheless, given the profound risks imposed by the current system, screening decision
makers would be a good first step.
Blindfolded Justice—long a symbol of impartiality —has a
deep historical resonance that harmonizes with contemporary
screening.313 As Resnik and Curtis have shown, the iconography of blind justice began its successful replacement of clear
sighted justice at a historical era characterized by new doubts
about decision making and decision makers.314 The blindfold
symbolized aspirations to eliminate improper influences, be
they class or kin allegiances, bribes, or bias.315 Similarly, the
role of the jury evolved during a crisis of legitimacy when trial
by ordeal and oath were deprived of their religious foundations.316 Today, doubts stemming from new understanding of
implicit or unconscious bias and other influences on decisionmaking processes, coupled with fear of distorting personal and
institutional allegiances and structures, are pervasive.317 To
Cautionary Tales from Law’s Blindfolded Justice, in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION
note 4, at 243.
312. Resnik & Curtis, supra note 311, at 243.
313. Pager notes the desirability of blind justice and links it to Rawls’
“veil of ignorance.” Pager, supra note 31, at 428.
314. Resnik & Curtis, supra note 47, at 203-04, 212.
315. Id. at 218, 222-24, 227-29; Resnik & Curtis, supra note 311, at 23738.
316. Fisher, supra note 9, at 587-602.
317. See, e.g., Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the
Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
149, 169-70 (2010). See generally Debra Lyn Bassett, Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias Across the Legal System, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1563
(2013); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of
Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291 (2006). See also
Christopher T. Robertson, Why Blinding? How Blinding? A Theory of Blinding and Its Application to Institutional Corruption, in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION
TO BIAS, supra note 4, at 35 (arguing for blinding expert witnesses with a
framework of personal advantage applicable more widely). Anna Roberts
notes “under the current regime, implicit bias is allowed to ‘flourish’ within
jurors, attorneys, and judges, . . . The protections in place, conceived in an
earlier era, fail to address the implicit biases that are now known to exist,
TO BIAS, supra
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retain legitimacy, legal decision-making must evolve again.
While blinding decision makers may seem an extreme
remedy, it is, of course, one already embraced by medical researchers, who must also make difficult decisions in the face of
imperfect knowledge, including imperfect knowledge of themselves and the impact of even their most carefully considered
actions.318 Further, blind decision making has liberating and
suggestive power. A powerful critique of blind justice is that it
legitimizes unwillingness to see, thus concealing, even from
ourselves, violence and inequity.319 Yet no matter where the
parameters are drawn, at times decision is required. At those
moments, a screen can protect individuals from suffering from
errors based their social, cultural, and physical selves. Further, a blindfold channels inward attention, as well as outward.
It foregrounds inevitable individual and institutional fallibility,
yet, however imperfectly, aspires to something more. For the
decision maker, the physical blindfold is a corrective to flawed
assumptions already unseen inside herself.

and in fact may intensify them.” Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 841 (2012).
She also proposes the Implicit Association Test to educate jurors. Id. at 85758.
318. Medical science’s commitment to blinding extends even to reviewers of results of blinded medical trials: “Blind assessments produced significantly lower and more consistent scores than open assessments.” Alejandro
R. Jadad et al., Assessing the Quality of Reports of Randomized Clinical Trials: Is Blinding Necessary?, 17 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 10 (1996).
319. I. Bennett Capers, Blind Justice, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 179, 189
(2012) (commenting that Justice is “not the only one indifferent to the horrors
going on around her. She may be the only one who is literally blindfolded, but
she’s not the only one who’s blind. They all are. So are we.”). Resnik & Curtis, supra note 47, at 233-35. Criticisms of medical blind trials echo criticisms of blind justice: they “produce protocols based on an idealized ‘average’
person that do not take into account the unique characteristics of individuals.” Caryn Devins et al., Against Design, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 609, 675 (2011)
(citing Stuart Kauffman et al., Transforming Medicine: A Manifesto, SCI. AM.
WORLDVIEW 2014, at 28-29,
http://www.scientificamerican.com/wv/assets/2014_SAWorldView.pdf.).
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Appendix A: Scratching, the Body, Lies, and Human
Dignity
From the beginning of the conflict between elite rule and
rhetoric and popular democracy and sophistic rhetoric, scratching figures as a debased “good” that competes with truth and
emerges from the satisfaction of need that ties men to animals
as a physical beings. When Socrates, in Aristophanes’ comedy,
asks an ordinary Athenian to get under some blankets and
think, the man (hidden from view) reveals what unrestrained
nature prioritizes: first he scratches and complains of fleas,
then he masturbates.320 A similar sequence animates the Platonic Socrates’ knock-out blow to sophists and their students as
indulging in a debased popular knack of persuasion based on
self-interest, rather than the elite art of truth telling. The sequence, beginning with the power of persuasion in the assembly among the mass of citizens, ends by asking whether “a man
who has an itch and wants to scratch, and may scratch in all
freedom, can pass his life happily in continual scratching.” The
“necessary” answer, “yes,” allows Socrates a quick pivot to sex
and utterly discredits popular, sophistic rhetoric and any democratic decisions it promotes by linking both to satisfaction of
private, bodily desire.321
For the elite tradition, the irresistible scratch quieting the
distracting itch marks the intrusion of the physical self.
Speech and truth hang in the balance as the speaker chooses
between mind and body. Choosing to scratch or simply scratching instinctively each reveal something deeply wrong. Those
who chose to scratch use reason to satisfy need that is disreputable at best, lethal at worst. Cicero was disastrously shortsighted: he should have realized the moment he saw Caesar
320. ARISTOPHANES, CLOUDS. See also DAPHNE O’REGAN, RHETORIC,
COMEDY, AND THE VIOLENCE OF LANGUAGE IN ARISTOPHANES’ CLOUDS (1992).
321. PLATO, GORGIAS 494c, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO
(Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., W.D. Woodhead trans., 1973).
The same elite contempt is apparent in in the comment dismissing a criminal’s petition that envisioned judges deciding “how many times a prisoner
should brush his teeth, go to the bathroom, wipe his nose, comb his hair, or
scratch?” Taylor v. Strickland, 411 F. Supp. 1390, 1395 n.13 (D.S.C. 1976).
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scratching his head with one finger that he might overthrow
the Roman Republic.322 Those who simply scratch because they
must reveal that body rules mind. Either way leads directly to
irrational passions and to lies.
Given the dominance of the elite tradition, it is not surprising that scratching, and nose scratching in particular, have become the iconic – if inaccurate – gestures that mark the liar in
legal and popular culture. Ordinary commonsense is invoked
as enough to know that judge and jury can detect lies when
“[t]he speaker may slightly rub or scratch the nose, usually
with the index finger (A big cue for deception).”323 Although
repeatedly debunked, the cultural tenacity of this meme is
demonstrated in the first episode of TV drama Lie to Me. Paul
Ekman, the expert on leakage and micro expressions whose
work inspired the show, told the New York Times that the producers insisted on using rubbing, otherwise known as scratching, the nose as proof of lying – contrary to Ekman’s advice.324
Its presence testified to the writers’ participation in our rhetorical/social tradition and their conviction that the audience
would understand and believe this trope.325
Yet the power of scratching, particularly the nose, to convey an irreducible human nature prompts an alternative use:
to sum up the whole range of basic human needs and to func322. PLUTARCH, LIFE OF JULIUS CAESAR 443 (Loeb Classical Library)
(E.H. Warmington ed., Bernadotte Perrin trans., 1967).
323. 84 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, supra note 93, § 28. Advice to attorneys emphasizes “[n]ever scratch an itch, no matter where it is. If your nose itches,
stop speaking completely, take out a cloth handkerchief, turn to the side, and
say, ‘Excuse me.’ Then wipe your nose neatly, thereby ‘scratching’ it.
Acknowledge jurors with a look and resume speaking.” Id. § 29. “It became
important that the students were aware of their ‘stage presence’ and did not,
as we observed, pick their noses, scratch their behinds, or stand on one foot
and let the other shoe dangle or fall.” Robert E. Jagger, Stetson: The First
Public Defender Clinic, 30 STETSON L. REV. 189, 206 (2000).
324. Bill Carter, He’s Inspired the Latest Crime Series by Decoding the
Traits of Liars, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/21/arts/television/21carter.html.
325. Mark Twain in The Prince and Pauper uses this trope to mock the
falseness of elite rules when the pauper, Tom, after a dinner during which he
realizes that to do anything with his hands is unbecoming, ultimately, to his
shame, cannot resist scratching his nose as ‘nature broke down the barriers
of etiquette.” MARK TWAIN, THE PRINCE AND THE PAUPER 342 (1920).
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tion as a marker for a realm of personal autonomy and truth
quite different from the elite image. It defines a realm outside
the state and its law.326 Thus, state overreaching is paradoxically conveyed as restriction that prevents scratching. Human
dignity and autonomy are violated when “freedom was restricted to the point that he couldn’t scratch his own nose.”327

326. “All the actions one might take with what is rightfully his or hers
can never be specified or reduced to a list. It includes the right to . . . scratch
one’s nose when it itches (and even when it doesn’t) . . . . The problem, therefore, with any explicit protection of these liberties is that the liberty of the
people can never be completely enumerated or listed.” Randy E. Barnett, The
Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 448 (2004). See
also Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1, 32
(1990).
327. Litigants know this trope as well: “‘with them chains you can’t
walk, you can’t scratch your nose or nothing, it’s very limited access’ (A: 434),
‘and most of all it was inappropriate . . . why not let them violate all of your
rights.’” Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 4, Murray v. M. McGinnus, 2003
WL 22513720 (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 2003) (No. 01-2632). See also Maria Bucci,
Young, Alone, and Fleeing Terror: The Human Rights Emergency of Unaccompanied Immigrant Children Seeking Asylum in the United States, 30 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 275, 302 (2004). Deprivation of rights
is summarized by being required to ask permission to scratch one’s nose. See
Heather Habes, Paying for the Graying: How California Can More Effectively
Manage its Growing Elderly Inmate Population, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
395, 402 (2011); Christine M. Gordon, Are Unaccompanied Alien Children
Really Getting A Fair Trial? An Overview of Asylum Law and Children, 33
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 641, 658-59 (2005).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/1

76

